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POST-KATRINA RECONSTRUCTION LIABILITY: 
EXPOSING THE INFERIOR RISK-BEARER 
STEVEN L. SCHOONER* 
ERIN SIUDA-PFEFFER** 
I.  INTRODUCTION: EXPOSING THIRD PARTIES TO HARM 
In this young century, both the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Hurricane 
Katrina have graphically reminded Americans that they do not live in a perfect world.  The 
aftermath of both events continues to weigh heavily upon the public and dramatically affect 
the nation’s fiscal outlook.  Moreover, the two events demonstrate that unanticipated crises 
such as these -- and the responses to them -- can cause unimaginable destruction and injury1 
                     
* Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program, 
George Washington University Law School; B.A., Rice University, 1982; J.D., College of 
William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 1985; LL.M., George Washington 
University Law School, 1989.  This Article derives from testimony given at a hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Superfund and Waste Management of the United States Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works in November 2005.  The authors thank John 
Duffy, Kathryn Kelly, Frederick Lawrence, Richard Pierce, Heidi Schooner, and Sonia 
Suter for their helpful comments, acknowledge the generous support of the Seymour 
Herman Faculty Research Fund in Government Procurement Law, and note that last year 
marked the passing of John Cibinic (1930 – 2005), who left behind a remarkable legacy in 
the literature, pedagogy, and practice of government contract law. See generally 35 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 3 (2005); 47 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 332 (2005); CONT. MGMT., Oct. 2005, at 70; 
and PROC. LAW., Fall 2005, at 20. 
** B.A., Amherst College, 2001; J.D., George Washington University Law School, 2006. 
1 See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1068T, SEPTEMBER 11: HEALTH 
EFFECTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d041068t.pdf [hereinafter GAO, WTC HEALTH EFFECTS] 
(“When the [World Trade Center] buildings collapsed on [September 11], nearly 3,000 
people died and an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people were immediately exposed to a 
mixture of dust, debris, smoke, and various chemicals.”); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-05-1053T, HURRICANE KATRINA: PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF THE NATION'S 
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d051053t.pdf. (“[Hurricane Katrina] affected over a half 
million people . . . .  [S]tanding water and high temperatures have created a breeding 
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as well as impose tremendous financial burdens on society.2  As all levels of government in 
the United States increasingly rely on the private sector to provide essential services to the 
public,3 post-disaster recovery efforts have come to involve a progressively larger pool of 
                                                       
ground for disease . . . .  Hurricane Katrina also resulted in environmental challenges, such 
as water and sediment contamination from toxic materials released into the floodwaters.”). 
2 See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-461R, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF 
CONTRACTORS RESPONDING TO HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d06461r.pdf [hereinafter GAO, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF 
KATRINA CONTRACTORS] (“Congress has appropriated over $62 billion as an initial 
commitment . . . to the Gulf Coast states impacted by the . . . hurricanes.”).  These costs are 
dwarfed by the costs associated -- directly and indirectly -- with the September 11th attacks 
on New York City and Washington, D.C.  Congress initially appropriated $40 billion to 
assist with disaster recovery. 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 
115 Stat. 220.  Shortly thereafter, it supplemented this amount with an open-ended 
appropriation for the establishment of the Victim Compensation Fund. See September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. II 2002)).  Indirect costs include, among other 
things, forgone federal taxes, see Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and other titles), and 
lost state and city revenue, see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-269, SEPTEMBER 
11: RECENT ESTIMATES OF FISCAL IMPACT OF 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK ON NEW YORK 
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05269.pdf. 
3 New Public Management (NPM), which gained hold in the United States in the mid-
1990s under the moniker “reinventing government,” is a movement to transform the public 
sector.  For the two works that are largely responsible for popularizing “reinvention” 
principles in this country, see generally AL GORE & NAT’L PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM 
RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS 
(1993), and DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
STATE HOUSE, CITY HALL TO PENTAGON (1992).  NPM seeks to apply traditionally private 
sector business techniques to the provision of public services and to thereby enable 
government to provide such services with greater productivity and efficiency.  See Jamil E. 
Jreisat, The New Public Management and Reform, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICE AND REFORM 539, 541 - 42 (Kuotsai Tom Liou ed., 2001).  Proponents of NPM 
advocate increased privatization and the “contracting out” of government services.  See 
GRAEME A. HODGE, PRIVATIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE 40 
(1999); see also Robert B. Denhardt & Janet Vinaznt Denhardt, The New Public Service: 
Serving Rather Than Steering, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 549 (2000); E. S. Savas, Privatization 
and the New Public Management, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1731, 1731 - 32 (2001) 
(providing several examples of privatization -- both domestic and international -- ranging 
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contractual arrangements,4 many hastily drafted and poorly managed.5  As was graphically 
demonstrated at Ground Zero of the World Trade Center attacks, when the government and 
its contractors rush to respond, those who physically carry out the response bear the 
consequences of their haste.  Many individuals who selflessly assisted at the World Trade 
Center site were badly injured.6  Many anticipate that relief workers will be subjected to a 
similar level of harm in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.7  
The risks faced by disaster area residents and relief workers can only be exacerbated 
when the parties who can best alleviate such risks fail to act responsibly and when the law 
fails to otherwise hold them accountable.  The doctrine of sovereign immunity limits the 
government’s legal liability for harms related to disaster relief,8 and, through the 
                                                       
from the protection of North Atlantic salmon to the renovation of military housing).  
4 See GAO, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF KATRINA CONTRACTORS, supra note 2, at 1 (“The 
private sector is an important partner with the government in responding to and recovering 
from natural disasters . . . .  [S]uch partnerships increasingly underlie critical government 
operations.”). 
5 See id. at 2 – 4 (reporting that government contracts awarded in the wake of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita suffered from inadequate planning, did not clearly communicate 
responsibilities, and did not sufficiently utilize oversight personnel). 
6 See generally Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Physical Health Status of World 
Trade Center Rescue and Recovery Workers and Volunteers –- New York City, July 2002 - 
August 2004, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 807 (2004), available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5335.pdf [hereinafter MMWR Report]. 
7 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H10235, 40 – 42 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Major Owens, and Letter from the National Council for Occupational Safety and Health 
(Oct. 6, 2005)); Michelle Chen, Relief Workers May Be Next Wave of Katrina Victims, 
NEWSTANDARD, Sept. 23, 2005, http:// newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/2395.  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has published guidelines and 
recommendations for Hurricane Katrina relief workers in an effort to address health and 
safety issues preemptively.  See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Hurricane 
Information for Response and Cleanup Workers, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/ workers.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2006). 
8 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a relic of royalty -- originating from the English 
common law premise that the King could do no wrong -- and its continued life under 
American jurisprudence is not easily justified.  See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 
(1882) (“[W]hile the exemption of the United States . . . from being subjected . . . to 
ordinary actions in the courts has . . . been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never 
been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established 
doctrine.”); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12.1, at 
342 – 43 (1993) (citations omitted).  But see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 
(1907) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete 
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the 
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government contractor defense, its contractors have been able to enjoy some of that 
immunity.9  As contractors assume a greater portion of the government’s duties, they are 
increasingly voicing their desire for increased legal protection10 where the government, 
shielded by sovereign immunity, would not face liability for negligent harms. 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Congress is currently considering legislation 
intended to provide insulation against liability for contractors involved in disaster relief and 
reconstruction.  The Gulf Coast Recovery Act (GCRA)11 would broadly apply the 
government contractor defense and thereby forestall private tort litigation arising from 
contractors’ work in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and other similar disasters.12  Not 
surprisingly, the GCRA enjoys strong support amongst contractors.13  Cognizant of the 
government’s current (and future) fiscal crisis,14 deficit hawks are reluctant to pursue any 
alternative program in which the government would indemnify contractors.15  Additionally, 
                                                       
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”); AMAN & MAYTON, supra, § 
14.1.3, at 532 (suggesting a functionalist justification for the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, namely, that the doctrine insulates the government’s official actions from undue 
influence) (citations omitted).  Indeed, many academics have expressed dissatisfaction with 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign 
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (“Sovereign immunity is inconsistent with a 
central maxim of American government: no one, not even the government, is above the 
law.”); David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 548 
(1997) (“Sovereign immunity is a rotten idea.  If states commit wrongs, they should be 
accountable for them.”). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 55 - 65. 
10 See Press Release, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Senate Bill Would Limit 
Contractors’ Risk of Law Suits for Aiding in Rescue and Recovery Efforts in Gulf Coast 
(Sept. 22, 2005), available at http:// www.agc.org/galleries/pr/05-094.doc [hereinafter AGC 
Press Release]. 
11 S. 1761, 109th Cong. (2005). 
12 See id. § 5. 
13 See AGC Press Release, supra note 10. 
14 See Gov’t Accountability Office, Our Nation's Fiscal Outlook: The Federal 
Government's Long-Term Budget Imbalance, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/ longterm/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2006) (“Absent policy change, a growing imbalance between expected 
federal spending and tax revenues will mean escalating and ultimately unsustainable federal 
deficits and debt.”); PETER G. PETERSON, RUNNING ON EMPTY 9 - 10 (2004) (“[I]n just three 
years [(2001 to 2003)] U.S. voters witnessed a negative swing of over $10 trillion in the 
ten-year federal deficit outlook.  By the year 2014, that will amount to $90,000 in additional 
federal debt for every household.”); Rudolph G. Penner & Alice M. Rivlin, Dimensions of 
the Budget Problem, in RESTORING FISCAL SANITY 2005: MEETING THE LONG-RUN 
CHALLENGE 17, 17 - 34 (Alice M. Rivlin & Isabel Sawhill eds., 2005). 
15 Deficit hawks, who place great emphasis on keeping the federal budget under control 
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critics of the plaintiffs’ and class-action bars support such situational immunity for 
contractors as a logical step towards tort reform.16 
This Article, however, asserts that the GCRA grossly misses the mark when judged 
against two commonly suggested normative goals of tort law: the GCRA neither serves the 
ends of justice and fairness by compensating victims, nor does it minimize the costs of 
harm by deterring contractors from acting negligently.17  This Article first criticizes the 
GCRA’s doctrinal structure, which is primarily founded upon an improper use of the 
government contractor defense.  By jettisoning the traditional predicate to the defense, that 
a government contractor has explicitly followed government direction to its detriment, the 
                                                       
and the federal deficit low, have become increasingly alarmed at the rate of government 
spending in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  See Donald Lambro & Amy Fagan, Defer 
Drug Benefit to Offset Katrina, Deficit Hawks Urge, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A2 
(“Deficit hawks both inside and outside of Congress say adding the cost of recovery and 
rebuilding to the deficit is a bad idea.”).  If the government were to provide contractors with 
indemnification, it would essentially be insuring its contractors against liabilities they incur 
to individuals injured by the contractors’ negligence, resulting in further government 
expenditures after national disasters.  See infra notes 173 – 175 and accompanying text 
(discussing indemnification for unusually hazardous risks).  Under the GCRA, however, the 
government would bear no economic responsibility for harm resulting from contractors’ 
negligent acts. 
16 The Senate hearing on the GCRA included frank disparagement of the plaintiffs’ bar.  
See infra text accompanying notes 132, 136 - 138.  This is to be expected in light of the 
political leanings of the GCRA’s sponsor (Sen. John Thune (R-S.D.)) and co-sponsors (Sen. 
Jim DeMint (R-S.C.); Sen. Michael B. Enzi (R-Wyo.); Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.); 
Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.); Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska); Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.); 
Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska); and Sen. David Vitter (R-La.)).  See 151 CONG. REC. S10378 
(2005); 151 CONG. REC. S10514, 10515 (2005); 151 CONG. REC. S10594, 10596 (2005); 
151 CONG. REC. S11130, 11131 (2005).  See generally REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2004 
REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA (2004), 
available at http:// www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf (“America’s litigation system is 
broken.  Junk and frivolous lawsuits are driving up the cost of doing business in America 
by forcing companies to pay excessive legal expenses to fight off or settle often baseless 
lawsuits . . . .”); Nathaniel L. Bach, Note, Trial Lawyer on the Ticket: Electoral Rhetoric 
and the Depiction of Lawyers in the 2004 Presidential Campaign, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
317, 319 - 36 (2006) (analyzing the tort reform “cornerstone” of the Bush-Cheney domestic 
policy agenda during the 2004 presidential election). 
17 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
24 (1970).  This is not, of course, to suggest that the GCRA’s only flaw is its failure to 
address the principle goals of tort law.  See infra note 79 (discussing the GCRA’s 
encroachment upon states’ rights).  Such problems, however, are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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GCRA unmoors the defense from its logical underpinnings -- the insulation of the 
discretionary functions of government from liability.18   
This Article further bemoans the economic inefficiencies likely to result from this 
distortion of the government contractor defense.  First, the GCRA fails to allocate the risks 
of disaster relief efforts to the parties who can best access information about the potential 
risks associated with such work and can most effectively avoid or protect themselves 
against these risks.19  Instead, it shifts these risks to individuals who lack the opportunity to 
assess, avoid, or insure against them.20  Second, by alleviating contractors’ accountability 
for negligent actions, the GCRA creates a moral hazard, diminishing the incentives for 
responsible contractor behavior and potentially increasing the incidence of harmful 
behavior.21  This Article advocates allocating the risks of disaster relief work to those 
parties who can most effectively minimize the costs of these activities or who can best bear 
the risks inherent in such work,22 a solution superior to that embodied by the GCRA.  In 
other words, Congress should allocate these risks to the party in the best position to 
understand, anticipate, assess, avoid, mitigate, insure against, or, ultimately, bear the 
potential loss.23   
                     
18 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 – 12 (1988).  For a more 
extensive discussion of the government contractor defense, see infra Part III.A. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 113 - 119. 
20 As discussed infra Part III.B, the GCRA does not preserve the possibility of victim 
compensation by either diluting the government's sovereign immunity or mandating that the 
government indemnify its contractors.  It merely leaves individuals without a remedy if 
they are injured by the tortious acts of contractors involved in, among other things, debris 
removal or reconstruction work in disaster zones.   
21 See infra notes 121 - 124 and accompanying text. 
22 The law and economics literature suggests the desirability of allocating risk to the party 
who can most effectively reduce the costs of harm or who can best bear the risk.  See Guido 
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1060 (1972) (proposing that liability should rest with the party best positioned “to 
make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs, and to 
act on the decision once made”); see also Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, 
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 83, 88 - 92 (1977) (analyzing risk allocation in the context of contract impossibility). 
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); Richard 
A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).   
23 Guido Calabresi’s categorization of accident cost reduction efforts into three tiers of 
“subgoals” is instructive.  See CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 26 - 31.  “Primary” cost 
reduction encompasses efforts to reduce the number and severity of accidents.  Id. at 26 - 
27.  “Secondary” cost reduction addresses the societal costs that indirectly result from the 
accident, such as rehabilitation and care of the injured.  Id. at 27 - 28.  Societal costs may be 
reduced, and possibly minimized, by spreading accident losses -- shifting the risk of these 
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This Article finally proposes that the GCRA is undesirable absent empirical 
evidence of either (1) a dearth of qualified companies willing to compete for the 
government’s business or (2) a market failure in the insurance industry.  This Article 
concedes that contractors involved in disaster relief may face risks for which sufficient 
insurance is unavailable.  Nonetheless, among all alternative solutions, the GCRA is one of 
the least appropriate; in all likelihood, it would compound the effects of the devastation it 
was intended to address.  Congress does not lack for more appropriate solutions to deal with 
whatever risks arise in post-catastrophe clean-up.  For example, the government could 
model risk management on the third-party liability provisions of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR)24; or the hazardous risk indemnification allowed by Public Law 85-
804,25 which permits contractual relief under extraordinary circumstances such as high-risk 
research and development involving nuclear power or highly volatile missile fuels.26  
Alternatively, the government could establish a victim compensation fund, drawing upon 
models such as the September 11th captive insurance fund27 or the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program.28  Each of these options is preferable to the GCRA’s unnecessary, 
inefficient, and unfair allocation of risk to the residents of disaster areas and the relief 
workers who come to their aid. 
II.  OPPORTUNISTIC POST-CRISIS BEHAVIOR 
                                                       
costs from individuals (i.e., potential injurers and victims) to society in the aggregate. See 
id. at 39 - 42.  Finally, tertiary cost reduction involves managing the transactional costs of 
the administrative or market machinery that is used to achieve primary and secondary cost 
reduction.  Id. at 64 - 66.  From this, Calabresi persuasively argues that the party best 
equipped to reduce the costs of the accident should bear those costs.  Id. at 40 - 42. 
24 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7 (2005).  The FAR “is established for the codification and 
publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies.” 
Id. § 1.101.  
25 Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 1435 (2000)); see also 48 C.F.R. §§ 50.403-1 to -3 (2005). 
26 See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Environmental Liability Under Public Law 85-804: Keeping 
the Ordinary Out of Extraordinary Contractual Relief, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 215, 260 - 61 
(2003) (explaining that the legislative history of Public Law 85-804 indicates that 
indemnification should be limited to research, development, and production in the fields of 
nuclear power or highly volatile missile fuels); Michael Abramowicz, Predictive 
Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 108 – 113 (2006) (suggesting nuclear safety regulation 
as a candidate for “predictive decisionmaking,” as an alternative to the limited liability 
model found in, for example, the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000)). 
27 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. K, tit. III, 117 
Stat. 11, 517 - 18 (2003). 
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2000). 
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Congress intended the GCRA to protect contractors.29  While the GCRA would do 
so, it does not serve the public interest.30  Specifically, it seeks to capitalize upon Hurricane 
Katrina’s devastation to obtain, for the contractor community, long-sought after, and long-
denied, insulation from liability in post-crisis situations.31  Unfortunately, this legislative 
initiative reflects a broader, disconcerting trend of seemingly opportunistic post-crisis 
behavior.  Under the guise of exigency, both the Bush administration and Congress have 
utilized Hurricane Katrina to effectuate public policies that are unnecessary and untenable, 
and thus might not otherwise have survived debate or scrutiny.  
For example, in its $51.8 billion post-Katrina emergency supplemental 
appropriation, Congress hastily raised the “micro-purchase threshold” (which, in effect, 
serves as the government charge card purchase cap)32 to $250,000 for purchases relating to 
relief and recovery from Hurricane Katrina.33  That hundred-fold increase on the existing 
                     
29 Section two of the GCRA lists the congressional findings supporting the bill’s proposed 
relief.  These findings emphasize that government contractors provide vital assistance in 
responding to national disasters and that fears of future litigation may discourage this 
assistance.  See S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).  The GCRA is thus intended “to ensure 
that . . . contractors continue to answer the governmental requests for assistance in times of 
great need.”  Id. § 2(12)(a). 
30 See Richard S. Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-
Justice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 243, 
249, 287 (2006) (arguing that governments of “rights-based [s]tates” are obligated to 
“maximize the rights-related interests” of their citizens, and thus should have “legally 
enforceable . . . duties” to (1) avoid committing torts against their citizens, (2) reduce the 
occurrence of torts between citizens, and (3) provide victims of tortious conduct with 
appropriate opportunities to seek redress).  Markovits concludes that “government officials 
can promulgate goal-oriented tort legislation if, but only if . . . the legislation in question 
does not on balance disserve the rights-related interests of the relevant society’s members 
and participants.”  Id. at 250; see also id. at 283 - 85.  Responsible government should 
focus on serving the public interest.  See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification 
for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (“[G]overnment’s 
primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and 
to reach consensus on the common good.”). 
31 See infra notes 128 and 135 discussing bills to reduce contractor liability proposed in 
the mid-1980s. 
32 See 48 C.F.R. § 13.201(b) (2005) (making government purchase cards the “preferred 
method” for micro-purchases). 
33 Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs 
Arising from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, § 101(2), 
119 Stat. 1990, 1992.  Although government purchase cards were first used during the 
Reagan administration in the late 1980s, their use gained momentum in the early 1990s 
with former Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review, which strongly urged 
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$2500 limit34 far exceeded the already flexible $15,000 ceiling Congress had previously 
made available during contingencies and emergencies.35  While pressure quickly forced the 
administration to bar further use of this authority,36 the fact that the $250,000 threshold 
became law at all, without meaningful discussion, is shocking.37  At the time of the 
threshold increase, more than 300,000 government purchase cards were in circulation,38 and 
a mountain of Inspector General reports, Government Accountability Office studies, and 
congressional hearings had demonstrated that the government’s management of its charge 
                                                       
agencies to increase their reliance on government purchase cards.  See Neil S. Whiteman, 
Charging Ahead: Has the Government Purchase Card Exceeded Its Limit?, 30 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 403, 407 - 11 (2001).  The 1994 enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. and 41 
U.S.C.), fueled government purchase card activity by (1) creating a $2500 “micropurchase” 
threshold (and thereby exempting purchases under that threshold from many of the onerous 
regulations that govern most procurements), see 41 U.S.C. § 428(b), (f) (2000), and (2) 
allowing agencies’ procurement organizations to delegate purchasing authority to 
nonprocurement card-holding personnel, see id. § 428(c); see also Whiteman, supra, at 411 
- 12.  
34 41 U.S.C. § 428(f); 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2005).  
35 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the micro-purchase threshold for supplies or 
services acquired by the Department of Defense for the purpose of defending the United 
States against terrorist attacks was increased to $15,000.  Federal Acquisition Regulation; 
Temporary Emergency Procurement Authority, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,120 - 56,121 (Aug. 30, 
2002) (codified in scattered sections of 48 C.F.R.). 
36 See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Executive Office of the President, Limitation on Use of Special Micro-purchase 
Threshold Authority for Hurricane Katrina Rescue and Relief Operations (Oct. 3, 2005), 
available at http://63.161.169.137/omb/procurement/ micro-purchase_guidance_10-03-
05.pdf (requesting that agencies not use the increased micro-purchase authority unless there 
are “exceptional circumstances”).  Nonetheless, purchase card usage appears robust.  The 
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security estimated the value of Katrina-
related purchase card transactions, as of December 30, 2005, at approximately 
$50.9 million. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, PCIE 12-17-05 
TO 12-30-05 BIWEEKLY REPORTING PERIOD: HURRICANE KATRINA AGENCY DATA, 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/ assetlibrary/OIG_PCIE_123005.pdf [hereinafter 
HURRICANE KATRINA AGENCY DATA]. 
37 See Bill Marsh, Here Is Your New Federal Credit Card, Here Is Your New Purchase 
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, § 4, at 14; Steven L. Schooner, Fiscal Waste? Priceless, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at B13. 
38 FED. PROCUREMENT DATA CTR., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT 
REPORT FY 2003 § 1, at 13 (2003), available at http://www.fpdsng.com/downloads/ 
FPR_Reports/FPR2003a.pdf. 
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cards was abysmal.39  Not only does the temptation of poorly supervised purchase cards 
encourage fraudulent behavior,40 but such programs also run counter to the fundamental 
procurement principles of transparency, integrity, and competition.41  In August 2005, the 
White House recognized these systemic problems and issued long overdue (and slow to be 
implemented) purchase card guidance, mandating fundamental training and risk 
management policies.42  Not only would the micro-purchase increase have exacerbated the 
existing purchase card management debacle, but it would have devastated many small 
businesses,43 which receive approximately two-thirds of all federal procurement dollars 
                     
39 See generally The Use and Abuse of Government Purchase Cards: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental 
Relations of the H. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002); OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., REP. NO. D-2002-029, DOD PURCHASE CARD PROGRAM 
AUDIT COVERAGE (2001), available at http://www.ignet.gov/randp/cards/dod-D-2002-
029.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-676T, GOVERNMENT PURCHASE CARDS: 
CONTROL WEAKNESSES EXPOSE AGENCIES TO FRAUD AND ABUSE (2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d02676t.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-717T, 
PURCHASE CARDS: INCREASED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL COULD SAVE 
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04717t.pdf. 
40 For a lengthy discussion of the purchase card program’s fundamental flaws, which lead 
to widespread abuse and fraud, see Jessica Tillipman, The Breakdown of the United States 
Government Purchase Card Program and Proposals for Reform, 2003 PUB. PROCUREMENT 
L. REV. 229, 234 – 41 (2003). 
41 See Steven L. Schooner & Neil S. Whiteman, Purchase Cards and Micro-Purchases: 
Sacrificing Traditional United States Procurement Policies at the Altar of Efficiency, 2000 
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 148, 158 – 64 (2000); Whiteman, supra note 33, at 442 - 55.  
But see Jeff P. MacHarg, Note, Doing More With Less -- Continued Expansion of the 
Government Purchase Card Program by Increasing the Micropurchase Threshold: A 
Response to Recent Articles Criticizing the Government Purchase Card Program, 31 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 293, 305 - 11 (2002). 
42 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR 
NO. A-123, MANAGEMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL CONTROL app. B, at 6 - 13 
(2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a123/a123_appendix_b.pdf. 
43 Typically, government purchases between $2500 and $250,000 would be set aside for 
small businesses.  See 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.501, .502-1(b), .502-2(a), .502-2(b) (2005); see also 
Schooner, supra note 37, at B13 (“Anecdotal information and experience suggests that the 
lion’s share of purchase card transactions benefit large businesses.  That’s not surprising, 
given the convenience offered by stores such as Wal-Mart, Staples, Home Depot and Best 
Buy.”); Whiteman, supra note 33, at 456 (“The Government makes the bulk of its purchase 
card transactions from large businesses.”). 
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awarded through contracts under $250,000.44  
Similarly, the Bush administration capitalized on the post-Katrina sense of urgency 
by suspending the Davis-Bacon Act in the counties damaged by the hurricane.45  The 
Davis-Bacon Act is a pro-labor compensation regime which requires that federal 
construction workers be paid no less than prevailing wage rates.46  Thus, prolonged 
suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act would have permitted contractors to profit from the 
massive reconstruction effort without ensuring that their workers receive wages sufficient 
for entry into the ranks of the lower middle class.  The administration’s putative 
explanation -- that the suspension would save taxpayers’ money and guarantee a sufficient 
supply of labor47 -- proved unpersuasive.  After widespread criticism,48 the administration 
reversed the suspension.49 
In both of these examples, reason ultimately overcame opportunistic encroachments 
upon established procurement policies.  Hopefully, reason also will prevail over the GCRA.  
It may well be that contractors engaged in post-disaster work struggle and sometimes fail to 
obtain sufficient insurance.  Nonetheless, prospectively releasing contractors from 
commonly anticipated liabilities allocates the risk of harms caused by contractor negligence 
                     
44 Telephone Interview with Paul Murphy, President, Eagle Eye, in Fairfax, Va. (Sept. 9, 
2005).  Eagle Eye is a commercial service that processes and repackages government 
procurement data.  See Eagle Eye, Inc., About Eagle Eye, http:// 
www.eagleeyeinc.com/Search.FPC?pg=10 (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).   
45 Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2005/09/20050908-5.html. 
46 40 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. II 2002).  To be clear, the Davis-Bacon Act does not mandate 
that firms employ only union workers: it merely requires that firms pay “prevailing” wage 
rates and benefits, which typically correlate with those enjoyed by union workers.  See id. 
47 See Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. at 54,227 (“The wage rates imposed by [the 
Davis-Bacon Act] increase the cost . . . of providing Federal assistance to [areas affected by 
Hurricane Katrina] . . . . Suspension of [the Davis-Bacon Act] will result in greater 
assistance to these devastated communities and will permit the employment of thousands of 
additional individuals.”); see also News Release, Congressman Charlie Norwood, 
Administration Grants Norwood Request for Temporary Suspension of Davis-Bacon Act 
Restrictions on Rebuilding After Katrina (Sept. 8, 2005), available at http:// 
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga09_norwood/DavisBacon.html. 
48 See, e.g., Editorial, A Shameful Proclamation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A16; 
Thomas B. Edsall, Bush Suspends Pay Act in Areas Hit by Storm, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 
2005, at D3; Susan Jones, Democrats, Unions Blast Bush Over Federal Rebuilding Effort, 
CNSNews.com, Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/ 
Politics/Archive/200509/POL20050909a.html.  
49 Proclamation No. 7959, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,899 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2005/11/20051103-9.html. 
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to the victims harmed by such negligence.50  That cannot be the optimal solution.  If the 
liability insurance market truly fails, the government -- as the party best able to assess the 
risk, avoid, mitigate, or insure against harm, and, should it be necessary, bear the costs of 
harm -- may ultimately need to indemnify its contractors, or otherwise finance the 
compensation of victims.51  Katrina’s devastated communities, however, should not bear 
the brunt a second time. 
III.  PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC INTEREST 
A.  Distorting the Government Contractor Defense 
The GCRA, which would grant virtually unprecedented liability protection to a 
contractor’s recovery work in disaster zones,52 is as inconsiderately drafted as it is 
misguided.  Its most startling (and, ultimately, problematic) provision extends a rebuttable 
presumption that the government contractor defense applies to contractors certified as 
“necessary for the recovery of a disaster zone.”53  This solution disregards the premise that 
government direction serves as the touchstone for the government contractor defense.54  
Moreover, the formulaic certification process provided by the GCRA, coupled with the 
federal government’s increasingly unstructured and chaotic contracting practices, renders 
this alteration of the defense particularly pernicious. 
                     
50 See infra Part III.B. 
51 “[I]ndividual moral rights holders whose tort-related rights have been sacrificed by 
[their] government['s] failure[] [to secure these rights by legislation] will have a moral right 
to receive compensation from the government . . . .”  Markovits, supra note 30, at 291. 
52 Similar liability protection can be found in the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering 
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act), 6 U.S.C. §§ 441 – 44 (Supp. II 2002).  
As discussed infra Part III.A.3, however, the GCRA is vastly different from the SAFETY 
Act, chiefly because the SAFETY Act applies only to extraordinarily risky and evolving 
technologies.  Although the SAFETY Act was a unique approach to liability protection 
when passed in 2002, Congress has indicated its intention to use the SAFETY Act as a 
model for other private sector industries not only through the proposal of the GCRA, but 
also through the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), Pub. L. 
109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818 – 32 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d 
to -6e), discussed infra Part III.A.3. 
53 S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(d) (2005). 
54 See infra note 62 (discussing of the importance of government direction, and 
consequent lack of contractor discretion, in the application of the government contractor 
defense). 
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1.  Ignoring the History of the Government Contract Defense  
The GCRA misuses the government contractor defense and, in so doing, damages 
its viability.  Although its roots trace to the 1940s,55 the modern government contractor 
defense grew out of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)56 and later found solid footing 
                     
55 In Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20 - 22 (1940), the Supreme 
Court refused to hold a public works contractor liable for erosion of the plaintiff’s property 
allegedly caused by construction performed under a federal government contract, applying 
agency principles to extend the government’s sovereign immunity to the contractor.  After 
Yearsley, lower courts struggled to apply the defense to a wider range of cases, specifically 
to those involving products manufactured according to government specifications.  See 
Randal R. Craft, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: Evolution and Evaluation, in 
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: A FAIR DEFENSE OR THE CONTRACTOR’S 
SHIELD? 3, 7 - 9 (Juanita M. Madole ed., 1986) (discussing relevant opinions between 1940 
and 1980). 
56 Enacted in 1946, FTCA, ch. 753, §§ 401 – 24, 60 Stat. 812, 842 – 47 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), initially exposed the military to liability.  See, 
e.g., Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 - 52 (1949) (holding that service members 
can pursue negligence claims against the government for injuries not incident to service).  
Soon after passage of the FTCA, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the government is 
not liable under the FTCA when service members’ injuries “arise out of or are in the course 
of activity incident to service.”  Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  After 
Feres, defense supply contractors became the target of choice in product liability suits 
because the government was no longer an available defendant.  That situation proved 
unfair, because contractors, compelled to execute clear government directives, did not 
exercise independent discretion.  The Court further complicated the legal treatment of 
military contractors in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 
(1977), a case in which malfunctions in a government-specified, contractor-manufactured, 
aircraft ejection system injured a serviceman.  When the serviceman alleged negligence 
against both the contractor and the United States, the contractor cross-claimed seeking 
indemnity from the government, alleging that “any malfunction . . . was due to faulty 
specifications, requirements, and components provided by the United States.”  Id. at 667 - 
68.  The Court relied on Feres to dismiss both the serviceman’s claim against the 
government and the contractor’s request for indemnification.  See id. at 669, 673 - 74.  
Feres and Stencel thus placed military contractors in a bind.  See R. Todd Johnson, 
Comment, In Defense of the Government Contractor Defense, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 219, 
227 (1986) (“The Feres-Stencel doctrine created an insurmountable dilemma . . . by 
excusing the government both from suit by serviceman and from indemnification actions 
brought by the contractor.”).  Their only option was to assert the still-developing 
government contractor defense discussed in this section.  See, e.g., id. at 224 - 27; Kateryna 
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with In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation.57  Agent Orange required that 
contractors manufacturing products for the government prove three elements to successfully 
assert the government contractor defense: that (1) the government established the product 
specifications, (2) the product met the specifications in all material respects and (3) the 
government knew as much or more than the contractor about the hazards associated with 
the product.58  In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,59 the Supreme Court modified and 
clarified these elements.60  Contractors may assert the affirmative defense when (1) the 
United States approved reasonably precise design specifications, (2) the equipment 
conformed to those specifications and (3) the contractor warned the government about 
relevant dangers known to it, but not the government.61  The first two elements “assure that 
the suit is within the area where the policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be 
frustrated -- i.e., they assure that the design feature in question was considered by a 
Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself.”62  Although Boyle addressed a 
                                                       
Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors & Civil Liability, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
(forthcoming 2006).   
57 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
58 Id. at 1055.  The court elaborated on the third element by explaining that a contractor 
was required to inform the government of information known to it, but unknown to the 
government, regarding the hazards of the product.  Id. at 1057.  The Agent Orange 
approach was adopted in large part by the Ninth Circuit in McKay v. Rockwell International 
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), which modified the first prong to allow the 
defense where the government either established or approved reasonably precise design 
specifications.  Thereafter, most courts followed the McKay formulation of the government 
contractor defense.  See Craft, supra note 55, at 14 – 25.  However, the Eleventh Circuit 
remained a notable exception.  See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740, 
745 - 46 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing use of the defense only if the contractor either 
participated only minimally in design specifications or warned the government of all known 
risks and disclosed known alternative designs). 
59 487 U.S. 500 (1988).  Boyle involved the death of a serviceman who drowned when he 
was unable to release the escape hatch of a submerged helicopter.  Id. at 502.  The plaintiff 
sued the contractor that supplied the military with the helicopter, alleging, among other 
things, that the escape hatch was defectively designed to be outward-opening, which made 
it impossible for his son to release the hatch when subject to water pressure.  Id. at 503. 
60 Id. at 511 - 12.   
61 Id. at 512. 
62 Id.  Focusing on the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, the Court reasoned 
that it makes little sense to subject a contractor to state tort suits for manufacturing products 
that conform to designs fashioned or approved by a federal official when the federal official 
would enjoy immunity from similar suits.  Although the FTCA waives the government’s 
sovereign immunity for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000), 
it expressly exempts matters in which the government exercises a discretionary function, id. 
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military product (or supply), lower courts have extended its application to nonmilitary 
products.63  Today, lower courts increasingly allow contractors to assert the defense with 
                                                       
§ 2680(a).  In an earlier case, Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), the Supreme 
Court elaborated on the requirements that must be met before the discretionary function 
exemption may be applied.  First, a mandatory statute or regulation prescribing a specific 
course of action must not have constrained the government decision being challenged.  Id. 
at 536.  Second, the government decision, when not so constrained, must have been 
grounded in social, economic, or political policy.  Id. at 536 - 37.  Thus under the FTCA’s 
discretionary function exemption, the government’s right to assert sovereign immunity is 
most likely to be engaged when a government official exercises discretion.  In contrast, the 
protection offered by the government contractor defense as established in Boyle will most 
often be engaged when the contractor demonstrates its lack of discretion.  Because such a 
lack of contractor discretion necessarily implies the presence of discretion on the part of 
government officials, the government contractor defense ensures that contractors are 
afforded liability protection only in those cases where the government itself would receive 
such protection under the FTCA’s discretionary function exemption.  See Peter C. Brown, 
Blowing the Lid Off Pandora’s Box: A Look at the Effect of the Design-Build Contract on 
the Government Contractor Defense, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, July 1997, at 17, 17.  
Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), decided before 
Boyle, illustrates the importance of establishing the element of government discretion in 
any assertion of the government contractor defense.  In Sanner, a passenger, who sustained 
injuries after being thrown out of a vehicle manufactured by Ford for the military, alleged 
that the company negligently failed to install safety belts.  Id. at 43 - 44.  Prior to 
manufacturing the vehicle, Ford offered the Army a design that included safety belts, which 
the Army rejected, “because occupants could be compromised due to deterred egress and 
escape in tactical situations as well as enhancing injuries in the event of a roll-over.”  Id. at 
44 - 46.  The court accepted the government contractor defense, finding that “Ford had no 
discretion to exercise with respect to installation of seat belts, roll bars or other restraints.  
The decision was that of the . . . Army[, which] specifically rejected the installation of these 
so-called safety devices.”  Id. at 47.  
63 See, e.g., Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1123 - 28 (3d Cir. 1993) (civilian 
ambulance manufacturer); Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 717, 719 - 21 
(D. Md. 1997) (manufacturer of keyboard equipment for the United States Postal Service); 
Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821, 829 - 32 (W.D. Okl. 1996) (manufacturer of 
letter sorting machines for the United States Postal Service);  Lamb v. Martin Marietta 
Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966 - 68 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (company in charge of 
operating a nuclear facility for the Department of Energy).  But see, e.g., In re Haw. Fed. 
Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810 - 12 (9th Cir. 1992) (precluding insulation supplier from 
asserting the government contractor defense because its products were not military 
equipment).  
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regard to service contracts64 in addition to product or supply contracts.65 
While the GCRA purports to apply the government contractor defense in the context 
of disaster relief with only a procedural variation, the GCRA effectively eviscerates the 
substantive legal underpinnings of the defense.  For certified contractors, the GCRA would 
create a “rebuttable presumption that . . . all elements of the government contractor defense 
are satisfied; and . . . the government contractor defense applies in the lawsuit.”66  This 
ignores the first requirement of Boyle -- that the government approve, in a reasonably 
precise manner, the scope of the work.  Again, the ordinary government contractor defense 
protects contractors who explicitly follow government direction to their detriment.67  
Although the government need not create the specifications or otherwise withhold all 
discretion from the contractor,68 some sort of meaningful government choice or decision is 
required before the defense can come into play.69  To the extent that contractors exercise 
                     
64 The FAR distinguishes contracts for services (from custodial to clerical and medical) 
from those for supplies (end items or widgets, from furniture to fighter aircraft) and 
construction (building, repairing, or renovating structures or improving real estate).  Service 
contracts “directly engage[] the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to 
perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.”  48 C.F.R. § 
37.101 (2005). 
65 See, e.g., Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 - 45 (11th Cir. 
2003) (accepting government contractor defense of a company providing helicopter 
maintenance to the Army); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. 
Supp. 400, 421 - 24 (D.S.C. 1994) (applying the defense to a company supplying 
decontamination services to the Environmental Protection Agency).  In the context of a 
service contract, the Boyle test remains essentially the same: (1) the government must have 
approved reasonably precise procedures to be followed in providing the service, (2) the 
contractor’s performance must have conformed to those procedures and (3) the contractor 
must have warned the government about dangers in those procedures that were known to it, 
but not to the government.  See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1335.  This test continues to focus on 
the “overriding question of who, the government or the contractor, ultimately had the most 
significant discretion in controlling the end result.”  Paul M. Laurenza & Michael W. 
Clancy, The Government Contractor Defense: Post-Boyle Expansion and the SAFETY Act, 
80 FED. CONTRACTS REP. 477, 481 (2003). 
66 S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(d)(1) (2005). 
67 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. 
68 See Carley, 991 F.2d at 1125 (“[I]t is necessary only that the government approve, 
rather than create, the specifications . . . .”). 
69 See Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The mere 
signature of a government employee on the ‘approval line’ . . . , without more, does not 
establish the government contractor defense.”).  Guidelines for contractors regarding the 
successful assertion of the defense emphasize the need to ensure that the government 
actually approved precise specifications or procedures.  For example, one author has 
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significant amounts of discretion in the performance of their contracts, however, the 
defense has not protected them.70  As summarized by Ralph Nash and John Cibinic, 
[T]he Supreme Court has given a set of straightforward requirements -- the most 
important of which is the Government approval requirement. . . . [W]here the 
Government agency is a full participant in the design process, the defense can be 
predicted to be a winner.  In contrast, if the Government has not participated in 
design the contractor will find it very hard to use the defense.71 
Thus, without a governmental act of discretion, there is little legal or policy justification for 
extending the government’s sovereign immunity to the contractor.  
2.  Violating the Spirit and Intent of the Government Contractor Defense 
The GCRA’s supporters assert that the legislation “implements the requirements 
already set forth by the Supreme Court,”72 thereby avoiding costly litigation involving the 
                                                       
advised that to assert a successful government contractor defense, 
the actual approving authority . . . should prepare to discuss not only what the 
Government wanted in terms of design, but the level of expertise among the 
government design approval team, and how dependent the approval officials were 
on the contractor’s designers for purposes of contract review . . . . [T]he 
Government should also provide a record of communications between the contractor 
and the Government, documenting the ‘give and take’ in the design process that 
shows conscious government approval of every design suggestion and change. 
John J. Michels, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: The Limits of Immunity After 
Boyle, 33 A.F. L. REV. 147, 160 (1990); see also Carl L. Vacketta et al., The “Government 
Contractor Defense” in Environmental Actions, BRIEFING PAPERS, Dec. 1989, at 7 
(advising government contractors to “do whatever [they] can to facilitate Govt [sic] review 
and inspection of every aspect of [their] contract work”).  Conversely, plaintiffs are advised 
that their “best line of attack” in response to a defendant’s assertion of the government 
contractor defense is to argue that the government did not exercise the requisite discretion 
over specifications.  See Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government 
Contractor Defense: Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 420 - 22 (1998). 
70 See, e.g., Raymond B. Biagini & Ray M. Aragon, The Government Contractor 
Defense: Limiting Product Liability in the New Procurement Environment, 39 GOV’T 
CONTRACTOR ¶ 169, at 3 (1997) (“[Only] the contractor that proves ‘the Government made 
me do it’ can share in the Government’s sovereign immunity.”). 
71  Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript: The Circuit Court View of the 
Government Contractor Defense, 4 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 52 (1990). 
72 Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Certain Governmental Contractor Liability 
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Boyle elements and increasing certainty and uniformity.73  The argument that the 
certification requirement fulfills Boyle’s first element,74 however, rings hollow, because the 
purely perfunctory certification process fails to consider the amount of discretion enjoyed 
by the contractor in performing the work. 
Contractors seeking certification would submit a request to the Corps of 
Engineers.75  To issue the certification, the Chief of Engineers need only conclude that 
(1) the work takes place in a disaster zone76 and (2) at least one-half of the work falls within 
specified categories, including routine activities such as debris removal, reconstruction 
work, and search and rescue operations.77  Unlike the judicial predicate for applying the 
government contractor defense, the Chief of Engineers need not consider the amount of 
discretion the contractor enjoyed in performing the work.78  Moreover, certification would 
control federal, state, or local government contracts.79  If certification involved a 
                                                       
Proposals on Environmental Laws: Hearing on S. 1761 Before the Subcomm. On Superfund 
and Waste Management of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong. 
79 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Craig S. King, government contracts 
attorney).  Craig King has further argued that “[u]nder Supreme Court standards, the 
Government contractor defense would apply to disaster relief efforts without S. 1761.”  Id. 
at 75. 
73 See Hearing, supra note 72 (written statement of Craig S. King). 
74 See id. at 78 (statement of Craig S. King). 
75 S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(d)(4)(B) (2005) (referring to “the submission of a request for 
a certification”).  The GCRA would encompass both past performance and future 
performance.  See id. (defining certification as a determination that “a government contract 
was or will be necessary for the recovery of a disaster zone,” and focusing the certification 
inquiry in part upon “the scope of work that the government contract does or will require”) 
(emphasis added).  Because the language of the GCRA does not specify the source of the 
submission, it leaves open the possibility that a request could be submitted either by the 
government, a contractor, or another entity, such as an insurance company.  See id. § 
5(d)(4)(A) (providing that the Chief of Engineers is responsible for reviewing “any 
government contract that any person or entity, including any governmental entity, claims to 
be necessary for the recovery of a disaster zone from a disaster for the purpose of 
establishing a government contractor defense”). 
76 Pursuant to the GCRA, the term “disaster zone” includes those geographical areas 
affected by Hurricane Katrina as well as any other region affected by a major disaster 
requiring federal assistance exceeding $15 billion.  Id. § 3(1). 
77 Id. § 5(a)(1), (d)(4). 
78 See id. § 5(d)(4)(c); cf. supra text accompanying notes 67 - 71 (emphasizing that the 
ordinary government contractor defense only protects contractors who explicitly follow 
government direction and limit their own exercise of discretion). 
79 S. 1761 § 3(2)(A)(ii) (defining “government contract” to include contracts entered into 
by federal, state, and local governments).  In other words, the Corps certification would 
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comprehensive review of the discretion retained by the government or delegated to the 
contractor, it might appear reasonable to presume that the elements of the government 
contractor defense would be satisfied.  The GCRA certification process, however, ignores 
the presence or absence of governmental approval of either the contractor’s methods or 
means of contract performance.  Whereas the sort of liability protection provided by the 
GCRA is usually reserved for government entities and those acting under their discretion, 
the GCRA extends this protection to parties whose decisions cannot be attributed in any 
way to the government. 
The GCRA would not only provide inappropriately broad access to the government 
contractor defense, but it would leave little procedural room for a plaintiff to defeat its 
preclusive force.  Once granted a certificate of need under the GCRA, contractors and 
subcontractors could raise the government contractor defense to defeat claims brought by a 
negligently injured party.  Specifically, the GCRA would entitle the contractor to a 
“rebuttable presumption” that all the elements of the government contractor defense were 
satisfied and that the government contractor defense applied to the lawsuit.80  Yet the 
presumption offered by the GCRA hardly seems rebuttable on its merits; if anything, the 
GCRA’s presumption is more analogous to a government official’s defense of qualified 
immunity.81   
                                                       
override negotiated or legislated allocations of risk in state, local, or municipal contracts, 
even if the federal government was not a party to those contracts.  This is not an isolated 
intrusion on state authority; the GCRA establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction for 
lawsuits arising out of the performance of a contract in a disaster zone.  See id. § 5(a).  
Thus, in the unlikely event that a contractor has not been granted certification (meaning that 
the government contractor defense would not insulate it from liability), a negligently 
harmed individual can assert state tort claims only in federal court.  Moreover, individuals 
injured by a Corps-certified state or local government contractor are denied recourse in a 
wide range of federal causes of action.  The GCRA expressly prohibits any action against a 
contractor engaged in disaster-recovery work (whether certified or not) under federal laws 
or regulations that are administered by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of 
Transportation, or the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.  Id. § 4(a).  
This means that individuals cannot hold contractors accountable for violations of, for 
example, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 – 1387 (2000), which is administered by 
the Environmental Protection Agency, see id. § 1251(d).  The propriety and 
constitutionality of these encroachments upon states’ rights, however, are beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
80 S. 1761 § 5(d)(1), (2). 
81 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials [as opposed to 
private parties such as contractors] . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
An official’s qualified immunity is overcome only by showing that the government official 
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Typically, a rebuttable presumption merely shifts the burden of proof to one 
challenging the presumption, who may then attempt to rebut the presumption by producing 
evidence to the contrary.82  Here, however, no effect would be given to even the production 
of specific, unequivocal evidence demonstrating the lack of those conditions traditionally 
requisite to the success of a government contractor defense.  The only way to overcome the 
GCRA’s presumption is through evidence that the entity seeking certification acted 
fraudulently or with willful misconduct in submitting information to the Corps of 
Engineers.83  Logically, a statutory certification system should be subject to reasonable 
constraints on the legal consequences of certification, informed by the substance of the 
threshold requirements for certification.  The pro forma certification provided for in the 
GCRA, however, violates such expectations; it offers no more than a procedural rubber 
stamp with a nearly indelible ink. 
Advocates of the GCRA suggest that the second element of Boyle -- that the 
contractor performed in accordance with the approved scope of the work -- is met because 
the GCRA only protects a contractor for work done within the scope of its contract.84  But 
reality belies this theory as well.  Post-September 11th experience has demonstrated that, 
particularly in emergency contracting, the government loosely describes its contractors’ 
work, if the work is defined at all.85  Contractors concede that this norm -- including oral 
                                                       
knew or should have know that his or her actions would cause injury to the plaintiff.  See id. 
at 818 - 19.  Similarly, the showing required to overcome the GCRA’s rebuttable 
presumption is quite taxing.  See S. 1761 § 5(d)(3).  However, qualified immunity operates 
somewhat differently than a “mere defense to liability” of the sort provided by the GCRA; 
qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances” and 
may be “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”  Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985); see also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's 
Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 190 (1993). 
82 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a rebuttable presumption 
as “[a]n inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be 
overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence”) (citations omitted).  
83 S. 1761 § 5(d)(3). 
84  See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 72, at 78 - 79 (statement of Craig S. King). 
85 See GAO, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF KATRINA CONTRACTORS, supra note 2, at 1 (“The 
[hurricane] response efforts . . . suffered from [i]nadequate planning and preparation . . . 
[and i]nsufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective 
contractor oversight.”); see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-274, CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE SURVEILLANCE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
SERVICE CONTRACTS (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d05274.pdf 
(finding that twenty-six out of ninety contracts reviewed suffered from insufficient quality 
assurance surveillance); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-605, REBUILDING IRAQ: 
FISCAL YEAR 2003 CONTRACT AWARD PROCEDURES AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 5 
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04605.pdf (“The agencies encountered 
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agreements and handshake deals86 -- pervades the post-Katrina recovery efforts.87  When a 
skeletal, overcommitted government acquisition workforce rushes to identify contractors, 
hastily drafts contracts (or relies upon open-ended, vague statements of work), and fails to 
manage contract performance, the government essentially delegates any exercise of 
                                                       
various contract administration challenges . . . stemming in part from . . . lack of clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities . . . . [D]efining key terms and conditions of the contracts 
remain[s a] major concern[].”) 
86 “A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual instrument that authorizes a 
contractor to begin . . . manufacturing supplies or performing services.”  48 C.F.R. § 
16.603-1 (2005).  Because letter contracts permit work to proceed before the contracting 
parties achieve a meeting of the minds, they offer a recipe for disaster.  Although Congress 
permits use of these “undefinitized contractual actions,” “[t]he general policy has been to 
greatly restrict the use of such transactions because they are open-ended arrangements that 
place the risk of excessive costs largely on the Government.”  JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH 
C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1073 - 74 (1998); see also 48 
C.F.R. § 16.603-3 (2005) (imposing procedural limitations on letter contracts).  
87 Anthony Zelenka, President of Bertucci Contracting Corporation, explained that his 
company went to work on an oral agreement to execute a written contract.   Hearing, supra 
note 72, at 24 (statement of Anthony Zelenka).  Warren Perkins, Vice-President of Boh 
Brothers Construction Company, indicated that his company was doing work “on little 
more than a handshake . . . .  We did not demand the time we would normally take to 
scrutinize contractual terms and conditions.”  Id. at 36 (statement of Warren Perkins).  
Further, Mr. Perkins stated that “the work that was asked of us had no specifications, had 
nothing to rely on, no design specifications, no specifications whatsoever.”  Id. at 44.  Mr. 
Perkins expressed doubt in the government’s ability to adequately direct disaster relief 
efforts.  See id. at 22 (“[T]he contracting agencies have to guide and direct the recovery 
effort. . . . [But] we cannot be sure that the agencies are in charge.”).  This open-ended style 
of contracting is not unique to post-Katrina recovery efforts.  Sweeping changes in the 
procurement environment emphasizing outcome over process have made the government 
more akin to a commercial purchaser; this trend has minimized government’s involvement 
in, and control over, product design.  See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The 
Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 630 - 31 (2001) 
[hereinafter Schooner, Fear of Oversight] (explaining that, at a macro level, the reinvented 
procurement system is (1) defined by greater purchaser discretion, (2) less encumbered by 
bureaucratic constraint and internal oversight, and (3) more businesslike).  See generally 
Steven L. Schooner, Commercial Purchasing: The Chasm Between the United States 
Government's Evolving Policy and Practice, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CONTINUING 
REVOLUTION 137 (Sue Arrowsmith & Martin Trybus eds., 2003) [hereinafter Schooner, 
Commercial Purchasing].  As the government delegates more discretion to contractors, “the 
new regime . . . casts doubt on contractors’ ability to enjoy the Government contractor 
defense’s protection.”  Biagini & Aragon, supra note 70, at 3. 
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discretion to contractors.88  Such open-ended arrangements fail to provide the specific 
direction or approval historically required for application of the government contractor 
defense.89 
The government’s failure to provide contractors engaged in post-Katrina clean-up 
work with an appropriate level of direction for invocation of the government contractor 
defense is due, in large part, to its current dearth of contracting or acquisition personnel.  
Congress was quick to authorize more auditors and inspectors general to scrutinize 
Hurricane Katrina-related contracting,90 but made no corresponding call for more 
                     
88 The lack of competition utilized in awarding contracts, although an inexact proxy, gives 
credence to the disturbing picture of Katrina-related contracting practices derived from 
anecdotes.  Despite the competition mandates of the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2701 – 2753, 98 Stat. 494, 1175 – 1203 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.), that pervade the 
federal acquisition system, competitive contract awards have been the exception, not the 
rule.  See generally 48 C.F.R. pt. 6 (2005).  As of December 30, 2005, of the 579 contracts 
in excess of $500,000 awarded by the Department of Homeland Security for Katrina relief, 
only 115 (or just under 20%) employed full and open competition.  HURRICANE KATRINA 
AGENCY DATA, supra note 36; see also 48 C.F.R. § 6.102 (2005) (listing “[t]he competitive 
procedures available for use in fulfilling the requirement for full and open competition”).  
In contrast, 378 (65%) of those contracts were awarded “no bid/sole source.”  HURRICANE 
KATRINA AGENCY DATA, supra note 36.  Government-wide, a similar trend emerges: of the 
905 contracts in excess of $500,000, only 246 (just over 25%) employed full and open 
competition, while 542 (approximately 60%) were awarded “no bid/sole source.”  Id. 
89 Over time, contrary to Congress’s intent to reduce litigation, the GCRA might provoke 
increased litigation against the government pursuant to the FTCA.  The GCRA would 
insulate contractors from liability even when the government aggressively outsources 
disaster-area work without giving proper attention to contract drafting or engaging in any 
meaningful oversight.  Under the GCRA, a negligently injured individual in need of 
compensation would have only one option remaining -- to sue the government.  The FTCA 
waives the government’s sovereign immunity and permits a suit in tort absent an exercise of 
discretion.  Here, an injured party might assert that the government delegated the exercise 
of discretion to its contractor.  This could be perceived to be an abdication, rather than an 
exercise, of discretion.  In other words, the discretionary function exemption might not 
apply when the government did not, for example, provide the contractor with clear 
guidance or ongoing oversight.  Thus, the government might find itself being held directly 
liable for the individual’s injury. 
90 Charles R. Babcock, 600 People Monitoring Hurricane Contracts, WASH. POST, Jan. 
13, 2006, at D2 (“The federal government has sent nearly 600 auditors and investigators to 
the Gulf Coast region to monitor $8.3 billion in contracts awarded to help victims of last 
year's hurricanes, according to year-end figures released by the Department of Homeland 
Security.”). 
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contracting experts to perform the functions necessary for the procurement system to 
operate efficiently.91  Sadly, the government’s acquisition workforce has been strained to 
the breaking point.92  Nor has the Bush administration suggested any reason for optimism 
that the issue will be addressed in the foreseeable future.93   
                     
91 See Steven Kelman & Steven L. Schooner, Scandal or Solution?, CONT. MGMT., Jan. 
2006, at 62, 62.  The contracting workforce has desperately required a dramatic 
recapitalization after the bipartisan, post-Cold War, 1990s initiative to reduce the 
contracting workforce. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-443, FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT: SPENDING AND WORKFORCE TRENDS (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d03443.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF 
DEF., REP. NO. D-2000-088, DOD ACQUISITION WORKFORCE REDUCTION TRENDS AND 
IMPACTS (2000), available at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/ audit/reports/fy00/00-088.pdf; 
Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 87, at 671 - 72.  
92 The 1990s workforce reductions left the government woefully unprepared for the 
dramatic increase in procurement spending since September 11th and Hurricane Katrina.  In 
the last four years, after years of stagnation, government contracting dollars have increased 
dramatically, with yearly rates of growth between 6.5% and 22.1%.  See FED. 
PROCUREMENT DATA CTR., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., TRENDING ANALYSIS REPORT FOR 
THE LAST 5 YEARS, http://www.fpdsng.com/downloads/ 
top_requests/FPDSNG5YearViewOnTotals.xls (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).  However, 
these increased expenditures on government contracts have not been accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in the workforce.  See supra note 91.  See generally Steven L. 
Schooner, Feature Comment: Empty Promise for the Acquisition Workforce, 47 GOV’T 
CONTRACTOR ¶ 203 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719685; Griff Witte & 
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Short-Staffed FEMA Farms Out Procurement, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 
2005, at D01.  At some level, this problem is exacerbated by pressure from the current 
administration to outsource.  Outsourcing, or its more palatable pseudonym, “competitive 
sourcing,” has been one of five government-wide initiatives in the Bush management 
agenda.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA, FISCAL YEAR 2002 17 – 18 (2002), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf; Dru Stevenson, Privatization of 
Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 83 (2003) 
(“President Bush is a major advocate of . . . hiring private firms to do the government’s 
work.”)  (citing David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. 
L. REV. 231, 232 (1998)); see also Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization 
of Property Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1763 (2002) (“Governor Bush sought to 
hand administration of the state’s welfare system over to . . . Lockheed Martin . . . and 
Electronic Data Systems.”). 
93 David Safavian, while serving as Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy under 
the Bush administration, made clear that the administration had no plans to invest in a 
recapitalization of the acquisition workforce.  See David H. Safavian, Feature Comment: 
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The government needs a massive influx of experienced professionals to identify and 
select quality suppliers, ensure fair prices, draft contracts, manage and evaluate contractor 
performance, and provide proper oversight.94  The negative ramifications of poorly planned, 
vaguely written, and ill-managed contracts in this context are obvious: they allow 
contractors to weigh, among other things, haste versus caution, or, to some extent, profits 
versus care.  For example, in removing debris from New Orleans a contractor might face 
significant economic choices with regard to (1) the experience of its personnel (drivers with 
spotless safety records might demand higher wages), (2) the quality and maintenance of its 
equipment (newer, better maintained trucks likely cost more to purchase or lease), (3) the 
                                                       
Delivering Results for the Acquisition Workforce, 47 GOV'T CONTRACTOR ¶ 267 (2005) 
(responding to Schooner, supra note 92, by claiming that “[a]n across-the-board call for 
more billets is an overly simplistic approach to a complex and challenging issue. . . . OMB 
does not support an increase in billets merely to establish an arbitrary level for the 
acquisition corps.”).  Sadly, Safavian’s indictment for obstructing investigations and 
making false statements during his prior position at the General Services Administration set 
back, and may have crippled, serious procurement reform for the remainder of the Bush 
administration.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former GSA Chief of Staff David H. 
Safavian Indicted for Obstruction of Proceedings and False Statements (Oct. 5, 2005), 
available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/ 05_crm_521.htm. 
94 A simple “lesson learned” in Iraq was that, if the government relies heavily upon 
contractors, the government must maintain, invest in, and apply appropriate professional 
resources to select, direct, and manage those contractors.  Unfortunately, insufficient 
contract management resources were applied.  See, e.g., Hearing on Contracting Issues in 
Iraq: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Readiness and Management Support of the S. 
Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), available at http://www.sigir.mil/ 
reports/pdf/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-001T.pdf (“[T]he important lesson is that 
oversight works . . . .  But, it works more efficiently the earlier it is put in place.  Provisions 
for formal oversight of Iraq reconstruction should have been established at the very 
beginning of the endeavor.”); Major Gen. George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu 
Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, in INVESTIGATION OF 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 1, 52 (2005), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/ d20040825fay.pdf (“[T]here was no credible 
exercise of appropriate oversight of contract performance at Abu Ghraib.”).  See generally 
Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in 
a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005).  Indeed, 
this problem exists across the entire spectrum of government contracts.  See Steven 
Kelman, Strategic Contracting Management, in MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY 
SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE 88, 89 - 90, 93 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. 
Nye Jr. eds., 2002) (“[T]he administration of contracts[,] once they have been signed, has 
been the neglected stepchild of [the procurement system reform] effort[].”). 
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means of performance (minimally acceptable environmental practices likely cost less than 
the most modern, clean, and safe technologies) and (4) time management (truck drivers 
might save time and money by transporting hazardous waste through, rather than around, 
residential communities).  Responsible governance would not entail ceding such decisions 
to contractors.95  Also, without an indication of true necessity, the government should not 
insulate its contractors against suits by parties injured as a result of the contractors’ 
negligent actions.  To do so would unnecessarily expose residents and relief workers in 
disaster areas to the detriments of contractor decisions unconstrained by democratically 
accountable government.  
3.  Form Over Substance: Misuse of the SAFETY Act Model 
 The GCRA makes more sense if considered in the context of the model upon 
which it is based,96 the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 
2002 (SAFETY Act).97  The SAFETY Act, a post-September 11, 2001 initiative, 
encourages the development and protects the use of new or evolving (and, implicitly, 
unproven) technologies.  Once the Under Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) certifies a technology as a qualified anti-terrorism technology (QUATT), a 
rebuttable presumption of the government contractor defense applies to lawsuits “arising 
out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism” when the QUATT has been 
deployed in defense against, in response to, or in recovery from the terrorist act.98  The 
SAFETY Act’s underlying assumption is that, without insulation from liability, contractors 
                     
95 See Seidenfeld, supra note 30, at 1514. 
96 Hearing, supra note 72, at 95 (statement of Craig S. King, government contract 
attorney) (“There is no doubt on earth this statute is patterned after the SAFETY Act.”).  
97 6 U.S.C. §§ 441 – 44 (Supp. II 2002).  See generally Alison M. Levin, Note, The 
SAFETY Act of 2003: Implications for the Government Contractor Defense, 34 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 175 (2004). 
98 6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(1).  Note that there is a difference between designation as a QUATT 
and certification as a QUATT.  Compare 6 C.F.R. §§ 25.3, 25.5 (2005) (contemplating 
QUATT designation), with id. §§ 25.6, 25.7 (contemplating QUATT certification).  
Although a QUATT designation triggers certain liability limitations, the rebuttable 
presumption of the government contractor defense only applies to a technology that has 
received QUATT certification.  See id. § 25.6.  QUATT certification is only available once 
a technology has been designated a QUATT.  See id. § 25.7(f).  It entails a further level of 
government review than that required for QUATT designation.  Compare id. § 25.3(b) 
(listing the criteria to be considered for designation), with id. § 25.6(a) (listing the 
additional criteria to be considered for certification). 
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might not otherwise permit the government to deploy these QUATTs to combat terrorism.99  
These contracts involve unusual types of work or technologies, or unusual uses of 
technologies, that are perceived as extraordinarily risky.100 
Recently, Congress also borrowed from the SAFETY Act model to create the Public 
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act),101 which provides broad legal 
protection to parties involved in the production and distribution of covered 
“countermeasures,”102 when the Secretary of Health and Human Services identifies their 
countermeasure in a public health emergency declaration.103  Unlike the PREP Act, the 
GCRA would apply the unique SAFETY Act model to far more common, if not mundane, 
tasks.104  Although they are clearly important, the contracts that the GCRA would cover by 
and large involve routine tasks such as search and rescue; demolition and repair; debris 
removal; and dewatering of flooded property.105  For services such as these, it seems far 
less reasonable to shield contractors from liability for all but the most egregiously wrongful 
actions.  These are not the types of work that can only be performed by an extremely 
limited pool of contractors or that require the use of unique facilities.  
                     
99 For a discussion of the SAFETY Act’s purpose and legislative history, see Levin, supra 
note 97, at 176 - 78; see also Laurenza & Clancy, supra note 65, at 482 (“[P]rotection for 
contractors against the potential extraordinary liability that may result from an act of 
terrorism is essential if the federal government is to be able to work effectively with the 
private sector in the development and procurement of anti-terrorism technologies.”). 
100 This point cannot be overemphasized.  For a cogent articulation of this principle (in 
the context of indemnification), see, for example, Tolan, supra note 26, at 260 - 61 
(emphasizing the unique and extraordinary nature of the contractual requirements, 
particularly in research and development, that proved uninsurable because they involved, 
for example, nuclear power or highly volatile missile fuels).  
101 Pub. L. 109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818 – 32 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 247d-6d to -6e).  
102 PREP Act sec. 2, § 319F-3(a)(1), 119 Stat. at 2818 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-
6d(a)(1)).  The PREP Act includes a rather confusing definition of “covered 
countermeasure.”  See id. sec. 2, § 319F-3(i)(1), 119 Stat. at 2827 – 28 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)).  Essentially, the term encompasses drugs, biological products, or 
devices that are authorized for use in diagnosing, mitigating, preventing, treating, or curing 
a pandemic or epidemic. 
103 Id. sec. 2, § 319F-3(b)(1), 119 Stat. at 2819 – 20 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-
6d(b)(1)).  Like the SAFETY Act and the GCRA, the PREP Act makes an exception for 
willful misconduct.  Id. sec. 2, § 319F-3(d), 119 Stat. at 2824 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
247d-6d(d)). 
104 See S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2005). 
105 See id.  While the scope of Hurricane Katrina’s destruction may be unprecedented, 
describing the work as routine reflects the nature of the work, rather than the importance of 
the work. 
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Contrast the private sector’s virtually unlimited capacity to provide, for example, 
demolition and repair services with its extremely limited capacity to develop the type of 
technologies certified under the SAFETY Act, such as “lamp-based infrared 
countermeasure missile-jamming systems that can be deployed on fixed-wing aircraft to 
defeat . . . heat-seeking . . . missiles” or “a computer network that screens and validates, 
using biometric screening techniques, the identity of persons entering or leaving the United 
States.”106  Although certified SAFETY Act technologies may involve “the normal work 
that [the companies producing the technologies] do,”107 they are not widely available in the 
commercial marketplace.  Thus, while it may be “normal” for the specialized firms to 
produce these technologies, nothing suggests that a significant capacity exists for the 
private sector to produce them.   
As discussed above, the GCRA process through which contractors would be able to 
obtain liability protection –- certification by the Chief of Engineers -- lacks any substantive 
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding contractual performance.108  This process bears 
little resemblance to the highly judgmental and discretionary decisions to be made by the 
DHS Under Security under the SAFETY Act.109  Specifically, the SAFETY Act employs 
seven criteria,110 most of which are absent in the GCRA.  For example, it is difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which there would be a “[s]ubstantial likelihood that [for example, 
debris removal] technology will not be deployed unless protections under [the GCRA, as 
opposed to the SAFETY Act] are extended.”111  Furthermore, QUATT certification is only 
                     
106 Both the missile-jamming systems, produced by BAE Systems Information and 
Electronic Systems Integration, and the computer network, produced by Accenture, have 
been certified as QUATTs.  Dep’t of Homeland Security, Recent SAFETY Act 
Designations/ Certifications, https://www.safetyact.gov/dhs/ 
sacthome.nsf/Awards?OpenForm (last visited Apr. 15, 2006). 
107 Hearing, supra note 72, at 96 (statement of Craig S. King). 
108 See supra Part III.A.2. 
109 But see Hearing, supra note 72, at 95 (statement of Craig S. King) (“Basically all the 
same types of protections that we are talking about [in the SAFETY Act] would be [in S. 
1761].  There would be a certification process, the whole sort of thing.”). 
110  The criteria are (1) prior United States Government use or demonstrated substantial 
utility and effectiveness, (2) availability of the technology for immediate deployment in 
public and private settings, (3) existence of extraordinarily large or unquantifiable potential 
third-party liability risk exposure to seller (or another provider of the technology), 
(4) substantial likelihood that the technology will not be deployed unless SAFETY Act 
protections are extended, (5) magnitude of risk exposure to the public if the technology is 
not deployed, (6) evaluation of all scientific studies that can be feasibly conducted to assess 
the capability of the technology to substantially reduce risks of harm and (7) whether the 
technology would be effective in facilitating the defense against acts of terrorism.  6 U.S.C. 
§ 441(b) (Supp II 2002).   
111 See id. § 441(b)(4); infra notes 130 - 135 and accompanying text (discussing the lack 
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granted after the DHS Under Secretary conducts a “comprehensive review” to determine 
whether the technology will perform as intended, conform to the seller’s specifications, and 
be safe for use as intended,112 while the GCRA requires no analogous review.  Thus, the 
SAFETY Act certification involves a significant, meaningful act of governmental discretion 
and thereby approximates the judicial inquiry applied to the government contractor defense.  
By forgoing such scrutiny, however, the GCRA abandons this traditional limitation on the 
liability protection provided to government contractors -- a limitation without which the 
extension of such protection loses its ordinary doctrinal justification.  
B.  Misallocating Risk 
 As a policy matter, the GCRA is unfair, inefficient, and unwise.  The GCRA improperly 
allocates risk of harm between negligently injured parties, contractors, and the 
government.113  As a matter of policy, a better solution allocates risk to the superior risk 
bearer or, alternatively, the least cost risk avoider.114  For most every activity that would be 
                                                       
of empirical evidence that threats of liability will significantly inhibit the market for the 
disaster relief activities covered by the GCRA).  
112 6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(2). 
113 Generally, the government expects contractors to purchase insurance and, accordingly, 
the government willingly pays contractors to obtain that insurance.  Prospective 
indemnification is employed only under extraordinary circumstances (for example, in the 
nuclear industry) in which contractors either cannot obtain insurance for a certain risk or 
cannot afford prohibitively priced premiums.  See, e.g., Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 
85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 1435 (2000)); 48 
C.F.R. §§ 50.403-1 to -3 (2005) (allowing government indemnification of contractors for 
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks).  Thus, indemnification -- through which the 
government, in effect, directly insures contractors rather than reimbursing the contractor for 
its insurance costs -- derives from a market failure in the insurance industry.  See generally 
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Risk of Catastrophic Loss: How to Cope, 2 NASH & CIBINIC 
REP. ¶ 44 (1988).  Bear in mind, however, that the indemnification debate focuses upon 
prospective allocation of risk between the government and its contractors –- it does not 
suggest that members of the public, if injured, should have no remedy.  
114 In addition to fairness, economic efficiency also appears to dictate that the costs 
incurred as a result of accidents be allocated to “the party or activity which can most 
cheaply avoid them.”  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View at the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1096 - 97 (1972); see also Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 88 – 92.  But see Gillian 
Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 515 - 18 (1999) (suggesting that the allocation of risk to the 
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covered by the GCRA, it is apparent that pursuit of either policy goal would require either 
the government or its contractors to bear the risk of their negligent decisions or actions.  
The superior risk bearer is the party best positioned to (1) appraise, in advance, the 
likelihood that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the harm if it does occur, (2) insure 
against the risk, either through self-insurance or market insurance and (3) bear the cost of 
the harm.115  In the unique context of post-disaster clean-up and reconstruction, the party 
harmed by negligent contractor behavior typically is less able to anticipate, assess, insure 
against, or avoid contractor negligence.116  Both the contractor -- through market-supplied 
                                                       
party best able to bear the risk is less appropriate when the government is one of the 
contracting parties).  Hadfield asserts that private sector assumptions of efficiency fail when 
transported to the public sector because “[t]o the extent that government has superior risk-
bearing capacity, it does not act in order to profit from this characteristic.”  Id. at 516.  In 
other words, the government transfers risk for reasons other than efficiency.  See id. 
115 Posner and Rosenfield defined the superior risk-bearer as the party better able to insure 
against the risk, which is determined by its (1) ability to determine, in advance, the 
probability that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the loss if the risk does in fact 
occur and (2) ability to diversify the risk away by pooling it with other uncertain events.  
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 90 - 92.  Economist Christopher Bruce has similarly 
focused on the parties’ abilities to mitigate damages resulting from the occurrence of the 
risk through insurance.  See Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the 
Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 322 - 23 (1982). 
116 In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953), the Supreme Court held that the 
FTCA prohibited a claim against the government by victims of the explosion of ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer stored in a ship at the docks in Texas City.  A negligence suit was filed 
against the government because the fertilizer involved “had been produced and distributed 
at the instance, according to the specifications and under the control of the United States.”  
Id. at 18.  Although Dalehite involved the issue of government liability rather than 
contractor liability, the dissenting opinion of Justices Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter 
emphasized the irrationality of imposing the cost of harm on the injured parties who quite 
obviously were the inferior risk bearers:  
The disaster was caused by forces set in motion by the Government, completely 
controlled or controllable by it.  Its causative factors were far beyond the knowledge 
or control of the victims; they were not only incapable of contributing to it, but 
could not even take shelter or flight from it.   
Id. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For additional information on the 
Texas City disaster, see generally HUGH W. STEPHENS, THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER 1947 
(1997); Samuel B. Kent, The Texas City Disaster, 1947, Hugh W. Stephens, 28 J. MAR. L. 
& COM. 675, 677 (1997) (book review); Local 1259, Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, The Texas 
City Disaster: April 16, 1947, http://www.local1259iaff.org/ disaster.html (last visited Apr. 
15, 2006) (detailing the events of the tragic day through an historical account, pictures, and 
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insurance -- and the government -- through indemnification, should market-supplied 
insurance not be available -- are far better positioned than the potential victims of contractor 
negligence to insure against the risk of such accidents and to thereby bear the cost of this 
risk. Nonetheless, by expanding the liability protection of the government contractor 
defense beyond its ordinary bounds,117 the GCRA imposes the cost solely on the 
negligently injured individual. 
Similarly, the least cost risk avoider is the party best positioned to take steps to 
avoid or minimize the harm.118  Even when a harm is nearly inevitable, a party may be able 
to either reduce the probability that the harm will occur or decrease the harm’s 
magnitude.119  For example, consider a contractor hired to demolish private homes in the 
New Orleans area that the government has deemed damaged beyond repair.120  Imagine that 
the contractor destroys the wrong house -- i.e., a house that poses no danger and was 
capable of being restored -- because either (1) the government was ambiguous when it 
designated the houses for destruction and the contractor did not seek clarification or (2) the 
contractor was negligent in its communications with the government about which houses 
were slated for demolition.  Whereas the contractor could have avoided a costly accident 
with the exercise of reasonable care, the homeowner would not even know of a need to take 
precautions that would have reduced the risk of the home’s destruction.  Yet under the 
GCRA, the homeowner would bear this loss. 
In so doing, the GCRA would reduce the contractor’s incentive to adopt prudent risk 
avoidance strategies (e.g., to inquire or confirm whether the house must be destroyed) when 
faced with such an ambiguity.121  Under the GCRA, contractors could only be held liable 
                                                       
personal stories). 
117 See supra Part III.A.1. 
118 The least cost risk avoider is often conflated with the superior risk bearer.  For 
example, Posner and Rosenfield perceive that the superior risk bearer is not only better able 
to insure against the risk, but is also better able to prevent the risk from materializing in the 
first place.  See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 90. 
119 See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 
73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) (“Even when necessary or unavoidable, an accident . . . causes 
harm.  The affected parties, however, can usually take steps to reduce the probability or 
magnitude of the harm.  The parties to a tortious accident can take precautions to reduce the 
frequency or destructiveness of accidents.”). 
120 Certification under the GCRA would most likely be granted in this case: the majority 
of the contractor’s work was the performance of demolition activities in a declared disaster 
zone.  See S. 1761, 109th Cong. §§ 5(a)(1),  5(d)(4) (2005); supra text accompanying notes 
77 - 81.  
121 See Hearing, supra note 72, at 31 (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright, Director, Deep 
South Center for Environmental Justice, Xavier University) (“If contractors no longer fear 
legitimate legal liability, where is the incentive to do good work?”); id. at 55 (statement of 
Dr. Joel Shufro, Executive Director, New York Committee for Occupational Health and 
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for negligent actions if they engaged in reckless or willful misconduct.122   By thus lowering 
the bar, the GCRA creates a moral hazard,123 increasing the possibility that third parties will 
suffer harm as a result of contractor behavior.124 
                                                       
Safety) (“What S. 1761 does is to shift the costs of personal injuries and property damage 
from the government contractors to the workers and/or the residents in the disaster areas.”); 
id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (“[The GCRA] sends a . . . message . . . to the 
contractors, well, do your best, because if you make a mistake, if you burn toxics, if you do 
some other things, you know, you won’t be held responsible.”). 
122 At the Hearing, Senator Thune emphasized that the GCRA “would not in any way 
limit any contractor’s liability for recklessness or willful misconduct.”  Hearing, supra note 
72, at 4 (statement of Sen. John Thune).  However, by limiting contractors’ liability for 
negligent acts, the GCRA insulates contractors from the consequences of a significant 
portion of their activities.  
123 “‘[M]oral hazard’ refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to reduce incentives 
to prevent or minimize the cost of loss.”  Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996) (citing Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: 
The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4 (1983) (“[T]he 
more and better insurance that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive 
individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences 
of their actions.”)); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further 
Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537, 537 – 38 (1968); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and 
the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 - 62 (1963); Mark V. 
Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968).  
Baker also explained that “economists’ models demonstrate[] . . . that insurance inevitably 
increases the occurrence, magnitude, or cost of that which is insured against.”  Baker, 
supra, at 241.  In other words, “[c]ontrol of moral hazard is essential to prevent . . . 
dissipat[ion of] any deterrent force that the tort system possesses.”  Seth J. Chandler, The 
Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral 
Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91 (1996).  In the context of contracting activities, moral hazard 
can result when a contractor is insulated from liability for negligent behavior during the 
course of performance and thus has a reduced incentive to take reasonable precautions 
against risky activities.  See Samir B. Mehta, Additional Insured Status in Construction 
Contracts and Moral Hazard, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 169, 182 (1996).  In Dalehite v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), not only did the dissenting Justices point out the irrationality of 
imposing harm on the inferior risk bearer, see id. at 24, but they also quite reasonably 
anticipated the moral hazard problem that results when parties are insulated from liability, 
see id. at 50 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It is our fear that the Court’s adoption of the 
Government’s view in this case may inaugurate an unfortunate trend toward relaxation of 
private as well as official responsibility.”).   
124 See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: 
Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257, 260 (1991) (“[T]he immediate 
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From a policy perspective, protection of the public from harm -- rather than 
protection of contractors’ economic interests –- must come first.125  Senator Barbara Boxer 
(D-Cal.) explained that the government “should be on the side of the people that get hurt 
directly, and [it] shouldn’t be in a situation where [it is] trying to make it more difficult for 
them to receive compensation[.]”126  Senator James Jeffords (Ind-Vt.) also warned that 
“[n]ow, more than ever, our government’s role should be to ensure that citizens are 
protected from faulty cleanup efforts.”127  Instead of pursuing either of these goals, the 
GCRA legislation would create a regime in which (1) the parties harmed by the negligence 
of contractors would bear risks that they could not effectively reduce and (2) neither the 
government nor its contractors would bear responsibility for harm inflicted through 
accidents that could have been insured against or averted with reasonable precautionary 
efforts.  Again, these line-drawing questions regarding contractor liability are not new.128  
But the solution offered by the GCRA –- that negligently injured parties, rather than the 
government or its contractors, should bear the risk of loss inherent in ordinary disaster relief 
work –- is as novel as it is unappealing.129   
                                                       
effect of the [government contractor] defense is to place the full cost of mishaps on injured 
parties who, but for government involvement, would be able to shift that cost to the 
contractors.”) (citations omitted). 
125  “The most important objective . . . is the assurance of prompt and adequate 
compensation of the public.”  A.J. ROSENTHAL ET AL., CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS IN 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 12, 72 - 76 (1963).  
126 Hearing, supra note 72, at 9 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer). 
127 Id. at 6 (statement of Sen. James Jeffords). 
128  The Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to a 1985 bill that would have reduced the 
liability of contractors, because it did not “believe that government indemnification of 
contractor losses is the appropriate way to solve the problems faced by government 
contractors because of changing tort liability.”  Indemnification of Government 
Contractors: Hearing on S. 1254 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 21 
(1985) (statement of Richard K. Willard, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
Division, Department of Justice).  Indeed, “[i]n the . . . few years [before 1985], the efforts 
of government contractors to transfer their product liability exposure to the government 
[had] increased dramatically.”  Id. at 22.  Although DOJ acknowledged “that the changes in 
the tort system have created problems for contractors, [it did] not believe that 
indemnification [was] an appropriate response, and certainly it [would not have corrected] 
the underlying reasons for these problems.”  Id. at 25. 
129 While some QUATT certifications no doubt shift risk to negligently injured 
individuals, the underlying policy is that the social good enjoyed by the public derived from 
individual QUATTs employed in combating terrorism outweighs the risks borne by 
potential victims.  This is analogous to the nuclear industry, which might prove 
unsustainable without protection from potential liability.  See infra text accompanying notes 
173 - 174.  But, as discussed infra Part III.C, no empirical evidence suggests any such 
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C.  Absence of Empirical Necessity 
 The GCRA’s drafters asserted that “well-founded fears of future litigation and liability 
under existing law discourage contractors from assisting in times of disaster.”130  Such fears 
apparently derived from the volume and size of post-September 11th litigation filed against 
contractors.131  That anxiety has been fueled by the contracting community, particularly by 
contractors that pursued post-Katrina government contracts without liability protection 
beyond that afforded by existing law.132  From this public showing of anxiety, the GCRA’s 
drafters concluded that contractors would not compete for government contracts in times of 
disaster without extraordinary liability protection, that disaster recovery efforts would 
consequently prove inadequate, and that the public would suffer.  Senator John Thune (R.-
S.D.) emphasized that the government would be unable to adequately respond to major 
disasters without contractor assistance.133  The authors readily concede this point.  The 
relevant issue is whether contractors can, or will, function without the liability protection 
afforded by the GCRA. 
Experience suggests, however, that the GCRA drafters’ premise is hyperbolic or 
simply incorrect.134  No evidence suggests that a significant number of the nation’s (or the 
                                                       
market failure in, for example, debris removal. 
130 S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 2(10) (2005). 
131 Senator Thune, who introduced S. 1761, explained that  
because of the ongoing multi-billion dollar class action cases filed against the 
contractors who assisted the Government in the cleanup of the World Trade Center, 
I have concerns that other major disaster cleanups, including Hurricane Katrina, 
may be stymied due to the potential for future lawsuits being brought against 
contractors who carry out major disaster cleanups on behalf of the Government. 
Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (statement of Sen. John Thune); see also id. at 8 (statement 
of Sen. David Vitter). 
132 See, e.g., id. at 38 (statement of Warren Perkins) (“I can assure you that responsible 
contractors throughout the Country are paying close attention. . . . They are aware of the 
litigation that followed [the September 11 attacks]. . . .  [T]hey are deeply concerned.”); id. 
at 25 (statement of Anthony Zelenka) (“Take a look at what happened [to contractors] in 
New York after the terrorists on 9/11. . . .  I believe passing the [GCRA] is necessary to 
ensure that contractors like me will be there to do the work in the future without fear of 
reprisals.”).  
133 See id. at 12 (statement of Sen. John Thune).   
134 At the hearing, Dr. Beverly Wright called this premise a “complete fabrication,” citing 
local contractors’ dissatisfaction with their lack of opportunity to compete for no-bid 
contracts for post-Katrina work.  Dr. Wright discussed how local contractors were ready 
and willing to accept the work and the corresponding liability.  See Hearing, supra note 72, 
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world’s) best contractors have been discouraged from seeking the United States 
Government’s business in the past.  The absence of empirical data or concrete information 
supporting this assertion by the GCRA’s proponents is stark, but in light of history, it is not 
surprising.135  
While they have thus far failed to put forth empirical proof, GCRA proponents have 
invoked the familiar critiques of opportunistic trial lawyers,136 emboldened by a popular 
anecdote involving a failed suit.137  This storyline has been enriched by rhetorical flourishes 
                                                       
at 32 - 33 (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright). 
135 At similar hearings twenty years ago, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) asked the 
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) whether any members of its association “no longer 
bid on government contracts because of the fear of liability suits.”  Indemnification of 
Government Contractors: Hearing on S. 1254 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong. 88 - 89 (1985).  AIA asserted that it lacked sufficient information to respond at the 
hearing and, in a subsequent written response, was no more convincing.  Even responding 
“on a non-attribution basis,” AIA failed to identify a single firm, and instead merely 
asserted that “[t]he consequences of unusually hazardous or nuclear risks arising under 
government contract . . . influence the business decision process.”  Id. at 96 (Letter from 
Lloyd R. Kuhn, Vice President of Legislative Affairs, AIA to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, 
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 28, 1985)).  Similarly, one year earlier, 
when Representative Sam Hall (D–Tex.) requested an estimate of the number of contractors 
who had restricted their bidding for government contracts due to liability concerns, the 
National Association of Manufacturers was unable to give him “reliable data,” stating 
merely that “we do feel that there are clearly contractors who will not bid for certain types 
of contracts, and that there are certain types of contractors who will not seek this type of 
business.”  Government Contractors’ Product Liability and Indemnification Acts: Hearing 
on H.R. 4083 and H.R. 4199 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and 
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 39 (1984) (statement 
of T. Richard Brown, Vice President, Law Department, Electronics and Defense Sector of 
TRW Inc., on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers).  When Representative 
Hall revisited the issue with John M. Geaghan of Raytheon Company, Mr. Geaghan 
admitted that he knew of no instance when the company refused to pursue a government 
contract due to liability concerns.  Id. at 161. 
136 See Hearing, supra note 72, at 25 (statement of Anthony Zelenka) (“[T]here are 
people out there who want to capitalize on this tragedy and others like it.  Lawsuits have 
been filed against contractors who have performed the types of rescue and recovery work 
my firm has been doing in New Orleans.”).  Of course, the GCRA’s advocates deny any 
animosity towards the plaintiff’s bar.  See id. at 38 (statement of Warren Perkins) (“I am not 
here to bash plaintiff attorneys.”). 
137 Government contractors have identified a lawsuit filed against Boh Brothers 
Construction Company as a sign that “[t]he madness has already started in Louisiana.”  See 
id. at 26 (statement of Anthony Zelenka).  The lawsuit accused Boh Brothers of performing 
Draft – Harvard Journal on Legislation (forthcoming 2006) Schooner (JOL 43.2)  Page 35 
 
 
regarding the putative dichotomy between patriots and trial attorneys.138  The GCRA’s 
supporters thus focus on the costs imposed by future lawsuits and class actions while 
neglecting to identify any ex ante disincentives created by those costs.  This mere fact that 
government contractors experience an ex post aversion to lawsuits is an insufficient policy 
predicate for legislation extending them liability protection.139  Although empirical 
evidence could someday validate the GCRA proponents’ argument,140 the threat of liability 
has yet to result in a dearth of available contractors.141 
Despite the post-disaster hysteria, the current procurement regime contains 
sufficient flexibility for the government to meet its contracting requirements in times of 
crisis.142  In awarding post-Katrina recovery contracts, the Army Corps of Engineers has 
relied on several FAR procedures that have allowed for increased flexibility in responding 
to the disaster.143  Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, the Corps advertised four contracts for 
                                                       
faulty bridge repair work which was apparently performed by an entirely different 
contractor, and the suit was dismissed, of course.  See id. at 26 (statement of Anthony 
Zelenka); id. at 33 (statement of Warren Perkins).  
138  One contractor beseeched the Senate to “not let the trial lawyers penalize the 
contractors like me who report for duty.” Id. at 27 (statement of Anthony Zelenka). 
139 See supra notes 128, 131 (discussing Congress’s rejection of proposed bills to reduce 
contractor liability in the 1980s); see also supra note 129 (contrasting the mere desire to 
avoid ex post liability with the social necessity of averting real market failures in the 
provision of essential or crucial technologies or services). 
140 See infra Part IV.A. 
141 See infra notes 134 - 135 and accompanying text.  
142 See Stan Soloway, Baghdad’s Lessons for New Orleans, GOV. EXEC., Oct. 1, 2005, at 
44 - 45, available at http://www.govexec.com/features/1005-01/1005-01advp2.htm 
(“[M]any of the flexibilities contained in the [FAR] . . . are poorly understood . . . 
includ[ing] limited as opposed to full and open competition, higher levels under which 
purchases can be made instantly, and more. . . . [T]hese flexibilities enable[] us to meet the 
demands for speed and agility integral to any recovery effort.”); J. Catherine Kunzsee, Pre-
Disaster Contracting: The Use of Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts, 
ANDREWS GOV’T CONT. LITIG. REP., Feb. 27, 2006, at 13 (discussing the importance of 
indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts in responding to national disasters); see 
also OFFICE OF FED. PROCUREMENT POLICY, EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT FLEXIBILITIES: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIVE CONTRACTING & GUIDELINES FOR USING SIMPLIFIED 
ACQUISITION PROCEDURES (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/ emergency_procurement_flexibilities.pdf.  
143 See Hearing, supra note 72, at 17 (statement of Major General Don T. Riley, U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers).  For example, contracts were awarded under shortened time 
periods under the unusual and compelling urgency exception to the CICA, 10 U.S.C. § 
2304(c)(2) (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(2) (2000), and on the basis of verbal and letter 
contracts as authorized by the FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 6.302-2 (2005).  See Hearing, supra note 
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large debris removal:  twenty-two contractors –- eighteen more than the number required –- 
responded.144  Although the response rates for other contracts were not as high, General 
Riley could not name a single contract that exhibited insufficient contractor interest.145   
IV.  FIRST, DO NO HARM 
Nonetheless, in performing government contracts, certain contractors may indeed 
require protection.  It is not surprising that Congress has sought to fashion a remedy to this 
limited problem.  The challenge, however, is for Congress to adopt an appropriate solution, 
rather than an approach that has the potential to harm disaster area residents and relief 
workers without fixing the putative problem. 
A.  Protection Without Moral Hazard 
This Article does not dispute the premise that certain contractors, involved in certain 
types of disaster relief, may find themselves unable to obtain adequate insurance to cover 
their potential liability.  Insurance is based on assessing, quantifying, mitigating, and 
transferring risks.146  In emergencies, however, a lack of certainty about site conditions and 
contracting requirements turns the consideration of such elements into an exercise in 
futility.147  If insurers are unable to quantify contractors’ risks, they may not be willing to 
                                                       
72, at 17.   
144 Hearing, supra note 72, at 40 (statement of Major General Don T. Riley). 
145 While General Riley testified that during the few weeks before November 2004, 
several contracts attracted only between one and five bidders, he did not identify any 
contracts that failed to attract a single bid.  See id. (statement of Major General Don T. 
Riley).  General Riley also acknowledged that there may be other reasons, unrelated to 
liability concerns, to explain the low level of interest in these particular contracts.  See id.  
While there may be some indications that the level of competitive bidding for Katrina relief 
contracts is occasionally less than optimal, there is no evidence of a total incapacity to 
attract bids and no reason to believe that fear of liability is the primary cause of any 
deficiencies in contractor interest.  See infra text accompanying notes 130 - 135.   
146 See Hearing, supra note 72, at 86 (statement of Paul Becker, President, Willis 
Construction Practice); ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT § 1.2 (1971) 
(“Insurance is an arrangement for transferring and distributing risk.”); see also KENNETH S. 
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 64 - 66 
(1986) (discussing the importance of accurate assessment and classification of risks). 
147 See KEETON, supra note 146 (“As one understands a greater percentage of the relevant 
facts, the element of guessing in his description of risk is reduced, and his prediction is 
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provide sufficient coverage for those risks.148  The contractors working at Ground Zero 
apparently faced this situation.149 
Moreover, contractors employed in emergency circumstances face a legitimate threat 
of litigation.  The inherently uncertain and unstable nature of disaster zones naturally leads 
to significant property loss, physical injury, or death.150  Regardless of whether contractor 
fault causes these injuries, lawsuits are likely to be filed against them.151  Even unwarranted 
or frivolous lawsuits can be devastating without adequate insurance.  These risks loom large 
for construction and debris contractors, which tend to be particularly small firms with thin 
                                                       
more reliable.”).  Insurance companies have expressed concerns about underwriting 
contractors working in disaster zones for several reasons: uncertain site conditions; unusual 
and unknown health hazards; questions regarding chemicals released during clean-up; the 
limited nature of tools available to assess environmental factors; varying local, state, and 
federal standards; the fast track nature of the work to be done; and unclear contractual 
provisions.  See id. at 86 - 87 (statement of Paul Becker). 
148 “[I]f insurance companies do not or can not [sic] understand the risks they are being 
asked to insure, they have a very difficult time providing the risk financing which allows 
companies to operate.”  Id. (written statement of Paul Becker).  
149 The Executive Vice President of Bovis, a contractor involved in the post-September 
11th clean-up, testified that “given the dangerous conditions, the retroactive nature and the 
unknown aspects of [the post-September 11] unprecedented effort, commercial insurance 
companies would not provide the coverage needed and ultimately only limited liability 
coverage was obtained.”  Hearing, supra note 72, at 51 (statement of Michael Feigin, 
Executive Vice President, Chief Administrative Officer, Bovis Lend Lease Holdings, Inc.). 
The President of Willis, a global insurance broker, testified that his company was only able 
to secure limited insurance coverage for contractors working at Ground Zero.  Id. at 85 
(statement of Paul Becker); see also Steven Greenhouse, Contractors at Ground Zero 
Denied Insurance for Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1. 
150 See SIERRA CLUB, POLLUTION AND DECEPTION AT GROUND ZERO REVISITED: WHY IT 
COULD HAPPEN AGAIN 14 (2005), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/groundzero/ 
report2005.pdf (“Any emergency involving the destruction of a large building is likely to 
cause a release of hazardous substances.”).  The New Orleans area stored massive amounts 
of toxic chemicals.  See Hearing, supra note 72 (written statement of Dr. Beverly Wright) 
(“Dozens of toxic time bombs along Louisiana’s Mississippi River petrochemical corridor, 
the 85-mile stretch from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, make the region a major 
environmental justice battleground.  The corridor is commonly referred to as Cancer 
Alley.”). 
151 Some injured parties sue the contractors simply because they “are the only [people] in 
there that can be sued.” Id. at 56 (statement of Anthony Zelenka); see also supra notes 56, 
62 (describing the scope of the government’s sovereign immunity under the FTCA).  But 
see supra note 89 (arguing that the government’s sovereign immunity may be limited when 
it abdicates its discretionary function).  
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profit margins.  Once more, the September 11th experience is instructive.  Some five 
thousand claims are currently pending against contractors who assisted with disaster 
recovery at the World Trade Center site.152  Even for those contractors facing meritless suits 
or those that can overcome a negligence standard, litigation defense absorbs significant 
resources that can threaten firms’ survival.153 
Thus, contractors’ desire for financial protection when working in disaster zones 
under emergency circumstances is understandable.  But that desire can be fulfilled in ways 
other than the dilution of tort law.  Broadly eliminating contractor tort liability is patently 
unfair to parties sustaining property loss or bodily injury as a result of negligent actions.  
Individuals living and working in disaster zones have suffered, and will continue to suffer, 
both financially and physically because of contractor irresponsibility and negligence.  The 
continuing negative health effects suffered by Ground Zero workers and lower Manhattan 
residents are widely recognized,154 and a “Katrina cough” appears frequently in the New 
                     
152 Id. at 48 (statement of Michael Feigin); see also id. at 8 (statement of Sen. David 
Vitter) (“We know from true, recent experience after 9/11 that there could well be a flurry 
of class action lawsuits to try to profit from the emergency measures that needed to be taken 
[after Hurricane Katrina] . . . .”); id. at 25 - 26 (statement of Anthony Zelenka) (“Hundreds 
of lawsuits were filed against contractors for the heroic work they did to clean up Ground 
Zero in a short amount of time at the express direction of the Federal, State, and local 
authorities.”). 
153 Id. at 48 (statement of Michael Feigin) (“[T]he problem isn’t that we don’t believe that 
we can sustain a standard of negligence.  We believe that we’ve done nothing wrong. . . . 
But the legal fees alone could put a company like ours . . . out of business.”).  In response to 
pressure from the contracting community, Congress eventually appropriated $1 billion to 
fund an insurance program covering injuries to workers incurred during clean-up of the 
World Trade Center site.  See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-7, div. K, tit. III, 117 Stat. 11, 517 – 18 (2003); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards 
Keep K Street Lobbyists Thriving, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1 (“The [General 
Contractors Association of New York] paid Carmen [Group Inc.] $500,000 to persuade the 
federal government to cover its members' insurance premiums for cleanup work at Ground 
Zero after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.  After three years of lobbying, the 
government agreed . . . .”). The government also appropriated separate funds to ease the 
burden September-11th-based claims would have on New York’s workers’ compensation 
system.  Pub. L. No. 107-117, div. B, ch. 8, 115 Stat. 2230, 2312 – 13 (2002).  See 
generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1013T, SEPTEMBER 11: FEDERAL 
ASSISTANCE FOR NEW YORK WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COSTS (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041013t.pdf. 
154 Joel Shufro, Executive Director of the New York Committee for Occupational Safety 
and Health, testified about these health problems at the Hearing: 
Unfortunately, four years following the devastating attacks on the World Trade 
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Orleans area.155  Nothing suggests that the injured and suffering individuals should, as a 
matter of course, be denied compensation.  As Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) explained, 
the solution provided by the GCRA “ignores and misapplies the lessons of September 
11th.”156 
B.  Superior Alternatives 
                                                       
Center, respiratory illness, psychological distress and financial devastation have 
become a new way of life for many of the responders . . . . Many of the workers are 
disabled by chronic pulmonary problems.  Some are unable to work.  Many have 
also suffered substantial economic disruption . . . and do not have health insurance 
and are unable to pay for treatment or needed medicine. . . . [T]here are grave 
concerns about the potential for workers developing slower starting diseases, such 
as cancer, in the future.  
Hearing, supra note 72, at 54; see also GAO, WTC HEALTH EFFECTS, supra note 1, at 7 - 
15; MMWR Report, supra note 6, at 808 (finding that of those Ground Zero workers who 
participated in a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study, 60% suffered from 
lower respiratory symptoms and 74% suffered from upper respiratory symptoms); Greg 
Sargent, Zero for Heroes, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Oct. 27, 2003, at 28, available at http:// 
www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/citypolitic/n_9384/ (discussing a 
severe pulmonary disease, and consequent financial stresses, suffered by a contractor 
employee).  Some of these health problems may have directly resulted from contractor 
negligence.  For example, according to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study, 
on the three days following September 11th, when exposure was greatest, only 21% of the 
participants reported using respiratory protection.  MMWR Report, supra note 6, at 808.  On 
any given day after that, nearly 50% of the workers were not wearing respiratory protection, 
something Mr. Shufro attributed to “a management problem.”  Hearing, supra note 72, at 
66 (statement of Dr. Joel Shufro).  Although some workers had protection and decided not 
to wear it, “Ground Zero workers -- lacking proper training and accurate official safety 
information -- had little incentive to wear the ‘uncomfortable and unmanageable’ 
respiratory gear.”  Michelle Chen, Ground Zero: The Most Dangerous Workplace, 
NEWSTANDARD, Jan. 24, 2005, http://newstandardnews.net/ content/index.cfm/items/1402.  
Furthermore, some workers received no more than a paper mask.  Id.; Hearing, supra note 
72, at 60 (statement of Dr. Joel Shufro). 
155 See Scott Gold & Ann M. Simmons, “Katrina Cough” Floats Around, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2005, at A10. 
156 Hearing, supra note 72, at 14 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton); see also Press 
Release, Office of Commc’ns, New York City Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Most 
WTC Health Registry Enrollees Reported New or Worsened Respiratory Symptoms After 
9/11/01 (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/doh/html/press_archive04/pr151-1122.shtml. 
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Experience offers superior alternatives to the GCRA that do not sacrifice the 
interests of negligently injured parties or contractor personnel.  The alternatives discussed 
below represent examples of the government’s prior efforts to solve insurance marketplace 
failures without denying a recovery to negligently injured individuals.  
1.  Remedy-Granting Clauses 
Ordinarily, parties to government contracts use standardized remedy-granting 
clauses157 to allocate the risk of anticipated and unforeseen contingencies158 between the 
parties.  The implicit premise of these clauses is that they (1) dissuade contractors from 
padding their bids, offers, or proposals when competing for government business and 
(2) reassure those contractors that the government will equitably adjust contracts to 
                     
157 See, e.g., Differing Site Conditions Clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-1 (2005) (anticipating 
subsurface or latent physical conditions that differ from the contract or unknown and 
unusual site conditions); Changes Clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1 (2005) (anticipating of 
potential changes within the scope of the contract); Government Furnished Property Clause, 
48 C.F.R. § 52.245-2(a)(3) - (4) (2005) (anticipating potentially defective, or late delivery 
of, government furnished property); Termination for Convenience Clause, 48 C.F.R. § 
52.249-2 (2005) (anticipating the government’s need to end contracts for a host of 
noncontractual reasons).  All of these clauses include a similar remedy for the occurrence of 
unanticipated contingencies: reimbursement of all allowable costs, plus an allowance for 
profit.  See Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and 
Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 695 - 97 
(1996) (discussing the use of standardized clauses to anticipate unforeseeable contingencies 
in government contracts). 
158 The FAR define a contingency as “a possible future event or condition arising from 
presently known or unknown causes, the outcome of which is indeterminable at the present 
time.”  48 C.F.R. § 31.205-7(a) (2005).  
[Contingencies] that may arise from presently known or unknown conditions, the 
effect of which cannot be measured so precisely as to provide equitable results to 
the contractor and to the Government . . . are to be excluded from cost estimates, but 
should be disclosed separately . . . to facilitate the negotiation of appropriate 
contractual coverage.   
Id. § 31.205-7(c)(2); see also Foster Constr. C.A. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. 
Cl. 1970) (noting the “long-standing, deliberately adopted procurement policy” that bidders 
“need not consider how large a contingency should be added to the bid to cover the risk”); 
Richard J. Kendall, Changed Conditions as Misrepresentations in Government 
Construction Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 978, 979 - 82 (1967). 
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reimburse for unforeseen contingencies.159  This “contingency promise” essentially 
provides that in exchange for the contractor’s willingness not to inflate its contract price to 
insulate itself against certain potential, although unknown, liabilities, the government 
agrees to make the contractor whole when such liabilities are incurred.160 
During the performance of government contracts, if an unanticipated contingency 
arises that requires the contractor to incur additional costs, the parties have a number of 
options.161  The contracting officer162 and the contractor can agree upon compensation and 
bilaterally modify their contract.163  Alternatively, the contracting officer can unilaterally 
determine the additional compensation to be paid.164  If the contractor is dissatisfied with 
the amount of compensation, it can file a claim, which commences the disputes process.165  
This orchestrated response to unforeseen liability in government contracts is a far cry from 
the GCRA’s insulation of contractors from liability.  Rather than providing the contractor 
and the government with several alternative methods by which they may allocate between 
themselves the costs arising from an unanticipated liability, the GCRA simply imposes 
these costs upon the negligently injured individual.166  
Generally, the government considers contractor insurance a cost of doing business.  
Indeed for some contracts, the government requires contractors to maintain a certain 
amount of insurance and permits reimbursement of the contractors’ insurance costs.167  
                     
159 Contingency planning strikes at the core of federal procurement policy.  See Ralph C. 
Nash, Jr., Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 698 - 700 
(1966) ([“T]erms and conditions . . . are an attempt . . . to define the remedies of the parties 
for most foreseeable contingencies that may occur . . . . [T]hese standard terms and 
conditions represent a relatively thorough statement of intended risk allocation.”). 
160 See Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 87, at 695 – 96.  
161 In addition to these options, the contractor may choose to absorb the additional costs 
and continue performance.  For example, the contractor may forego making a claim against 
the government if its assessment of the 1990s reforms –- such as the evaluation of past 
performance -– persuades it that the opportunity cost of pursuing the claim outweighs the 
value of the claim.  See Schooner, supra note 94, at 697 - 98. 
162 A contracting officer is a government employee with actual, legal authority to bind the 
government in contract.  See 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1 (2005) (providing that contracting officers 
have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings); see also RALPH C. NASH, JR., STEVEN L. SCHOONER & KAREN 
R. O’BRIAN, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT 127 (2d ed. 1998). 
163 48 C.F.R. § 43.103(a). 
164 Id. §§ 43.103(b), .201. 
165 Id. §§ 33.206, 52.233-1; see also 41 U.S.C. §§ 601 - 13 (2000). 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 113 - 120. 
167 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(a), (c)(1) (2005); see also id. §§ 28.301, 31.205-19 (2005) 
(providing a policy prescription and cost principles regarding insurance of government 
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Further, the government may indemnify a contractor for certain liabilities to third parties 
(and expenses incidental to such liabilities) above and beyond those covered by insurance 
when the liabilities arise out of the performance of the contract.168  The former mechanism 
allocates the responsibility of procuring adequate insurance to the contractor, after which 
the government reimburses the contractor for the costs of obtaining such protection against 
risk; the latter directly gives contractors an extra layer of insurance.    
The FAR’s third-party liability provisions could serve as a model for government 
indemnification of contractors engaged in disaster relief.169  They would, however, need to 
be modified in at least two respects.  First, construction and engineering contracts, both of 
which are prevalent in disaster recovery efforts, currently are exempted from agreements of 
this nature.170  Second, and more problematic, liability protection is subject to the 
availability of appropriated funds at the time the contingency occurs.171  As discussed 
below, however, once insurance becomes either unattainable or so expensive that the 
government is no longer willing to pay for it, the government should be willing to 
indemnify its contractors. 
2.  Extraordinary Protection For Extraordinary Risks 
                                                       
contractors).  
168 Id. § 52.228-7(c)(2).  The government limits its assumption of liability to claims based 
on death, bodily injury, or property damage arising out of performance of the contract.  Id.  
It disallows indemnification for liabilities that, under the terms of the contract, were the 
responsibility of the contractor or that were attributable to the contractor’s “willful 
misconduct or lack of good faith.”  Id. § 52.228-7(e). 
169 See 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(a), (c).  Under the indemnification provision, contractors are 
only reimbursed for “final judgments or settlements approved in writing by the 
Government.”  Id. § 52.228-7(c)(2).  Therefore, contractors do not necessarily avoid the up-
front costs associated with litigation through this type of contractual agreement.  See 
Hearing, supra note 72, at 76 (statement of Craig S. King).  Note, however, that when a 
contractor is facing a third-party suit that may be reimbursable under the FAR, the 
government is given the option to “settle or defend the claim and to represent the 
Contractor in or to take charge of any litigation.”  48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(g)(3) (2005).  In the 
event that the government chooses to exercise this right, the contractor is able to avoid 
litigation expenses.  
170 48 C.F.R. § 28.311-1 (2005). 
171 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(d).  In the context of disaster recovery, the potential liability is 
significant.  Thus, it is unlikely that the government would have appropriated sufficient 
funds, thereby leaving contractors with a large amount of residual liability.  See Richard A. 
Smith, Indemnification of Government Contractors, BRIEFING PAPERS, Oct. 1982, at 1 
(discussing the application of the Antideficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877 
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.)). 
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With few exceptions,172 when commercial insurance becomes unavailable or 
inordinately expensive, the government historically has indemnified contractors and, in 
effect, become a direct insurer of its contractors.173  Under Public Law 85-804, the 
President may delegate authority to various agencies to provide extraordinary relief for 
contracts in connection with the national defense.174  This relief includes indemnification in 
those extraordinary circumstances when contracts involve “unusually hazardous or nuclear 
risks” for which commercial insurance is unavailable or insufficient.175  Granted, this 
statutory vehicle is a tool of last resort, reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances when 
the private sector market fails.176  Also, like the FAR third-party liability clauses, Public 
                     
172 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the SAFETY Act and the PREP Act). 
173 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 2232 (2d Sess. 1958) (indicating Congress’s intent to 
authorize the use of indemnification where commercial insurance was unavailable). 
174 Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 1435 (2000)).  
See generally Kevin P. Mullen, Extraordinary Contractual Relief: Public Law 85-804 in 
the Homeland Security Era, PROCUREMENT LAW., Summer 2002, at 1 (providing a 
comprehensive overview of the history and substance of Public Law 85-804).  Other 
examples of statutory indemnification authority also exist.  See 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (2000) 
(allowing the military to indemnify research and development contractors for “unusually 
hazardous risks”); 42 U.S.C. § 241(a)(7) (2000) (allowing the Department of Health and 
Human Services to indemnify contractors under the same terms as the military as outlined 
in 10 U.S.C. § 2354); 42 U.S.C. § 2458(b) (2000) (allowing the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration to indemnify users of space vehicles).   
175 48 C.F.R. § 50.403-1 (2005); see also id. § 52.250-1 (providing a clause to be inserted 
in contracts that have been approved for indemnification).  Like the FAR third-party 
liability provisions, the government’s liability under Public Law 85-804 does not extend to 
claims that arise from contractors’ willful misconduct or lack of good faith.  Compare 48 
C.F.R. § 52.250-1(d) with id. § 52.228-7(e).  Thus far, thirteen major agencies have been 
granted indemnification authority: the Atomic Energy Commission; Department of 
Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of Defense; Department of Health and 
Human Services; Department of the Interior; Department of Transportation; Department of 
the Treasury; Federal Emergency Management Agency; General Services Administration; 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Tennessee Valley Authority; and 
Government Printing Office.  Exec. Order No. 10,789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 § 21 (Nov. 14, 
1958), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (Sept. 27, 1962); Exec. 
Order No. 11,382, 32 Fed. Reg. 16,247 (Nov. 28, 1967); Exec. Order No. 11,610, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 13,755 (July 22, 1971); Exec. Order No. 12,148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43,239 (July 20, 1979); 
Exec. Order No. 13,232, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,941 (Oct. 20, 2001). 
176 The FAR directs agencies not to use their authority under Public Law 85-804 “when 
other adequate legal authority exists.”  48 C.F.R. § 50.102(a).  The FAR also warns 
agencies to avoid granting indemnification “in a manner that encourages carelessness and 
laxity on the part of persons engaged in the defense effort.”  Id. 
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Law 85-804 neither avoids the government’s current fiscal crisis177 nor allows contractors 
to escape the litigation process.  Litigation expenses, however, are reimbursable.178  
Furthermore, indemnification under this statute is not constrained by congressional 
appropriations.179  Given the potential magnitude of third-party claims arising out of 
disaster recovery work, this would prove especially helpful to contractors engaged in post-
Katrina clean-up.180  
Although Public Law 85-804 currently applies only to national security situations, 
Congress easily could expand it to cover other circumstances where contractors might not 
be able to obtain sufficient insurance, such as disaster relief.  Indemnification is preferable 
to the GCRA not only because it protects contractors from potentially devastating 
liabilities, but also because it helps negligently injured individuals receive compensation.181  
Contractors “should not be penalized for showing up,” nor should negligently injured 
individuals be left without a remedy.  The Public Law 85-804 model would satisfy both of 
these admirable goals.  
3.  Funds 
 Another indemnification model is the $1 billion liability insurance fund created by 
Congress to protect contractors and the State and City of New York against claims related 
to debris removal after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.182  Contractors that 
                     
177 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
178 48 C.F.R. § 52.250-1(b) (“[T]he Government shall . . . indemnify the Contractor 
against . . . [c]laims (including reasonable expenses of litigation or settlement) by third 
persons (including employees of the Contractor) for death; personal injury; or loss of, 
damage to, or loss of use of property.”). 
179 Exec. Order No. 11,610, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,755 (July 22, 1971); cf. 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-
7(d) (subjecting the FAR third party liability provisions to the availability of appropriated 
funds at the time a contingency occurs). 
180 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  
181 See ROSENTHAL, supra note 125, at 97 - 108 (discussing the benefits and shortcomings 
of government indemnification of contractors for catastrophic accidents). 
182 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, div. K, tit. III, 117 Stat 11, 517 - 18 
(2003) (“[FEMA] is directed to provide . . . up to $1,000,000,000 to establish a captive 
insurance company or other appropriate insurance mechanism for claims arising from 
debris removal . . . .”); see also U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC 
ASSISTANCE 1749 – 50 (2005), available at http://12.46.245.173/CFDA/ pdf/catalog.pdf 
(detailing the history, objectives, and application process for the creation of the captive 
insurance company); Act of July 22, 2003, 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws 839 - 41 (McKinney) 
(codified at N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7001 – 7012 (McKinney 2003)) (authorizing formation of a 
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began work at Ground Zero immediately after the terrorist attacks subsequently failed to 
obtain sufficient liability insurance due to the uncertain nature of the risks and the 
potentially large number of liability claims.183  Therefore, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) appropriated funds for the creation of an insurance company 
to provide $1 billion in third-party liability coverage for a period of twenty-five years.184  
The City of New York is the named insured on the fund, with approximately 140 of the 
city’s contractors and subcontractors as additional named insureds.185  The captive 
insurance program is currently defending New York City and its contractors in several 
lawsuits arising from their debris removal efforts.186  The indemnification provided by the 
fund is more forward-looking than that granted by Public Law 85-804.  Although it was 
created subsequent to many of the covered injuries, plenty of injuries encompassed by the 
fund came to light after its creation and, indeed, are continuing to arise today.187  Because 
the captive insurance fund has proven to be extremely useful to contractors facing liability 
                                                       
captive insurance company for liability arising out of disaster relief at the World Trade 
Center after September 11th). 
183 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-926, DISASTER ASSISTANCE: 
INFORMATION ON FEMA’S POST 9/11 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW YORK CITY AREA 16 
(2003) [hereinafter GAO, FEMA’S 9/11 ASSISTANCE]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-04-72, SEPTEMBER 11: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW 
YORK CITY AREA 26 (2004) [hereinafter GAO, 9/11 FEDERAL ASSISTANCE]; Steven 
Greenhouse, Contractors at Ground Zero Denied Insurance for Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
18, 2002, at B1.   
184 GAO, FEMA’S 9/11 ASSISTANCE, supra note 183, at 15 - 16; GAO, 9/11 FEDERAL 
ASSISTANCE, supra note 183, at 26 - 27.  Although FEMA initially indicated that the 
insurance fund would be limited to claims for injuries occurring after September 29, 2001, 
when the rescue work officially ended, it subsequently backed off from that position.  
Jennifer Steinhauer, City May Bear $350 Million in 9/11 Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004, 
at B1; Mike McIntire, New York and FEMA End Dispute Over 9/11 Medical Claims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at B3.  
185 Hearing, supra note 72, at 48 (statement of Michael Feigin). 
186 See id. at 51 (statement of Michael Feigin); Complaint, DiVirgilio v. Silverstein 
Properties, 04-CV-07239 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2004) (initiating a class action lawsuit on 
behalf of approximately 800 people involved in the clean-up and rescue efforts at Ground 
Zero against, inter alia, the four government contractors that led the clean-up:  Turner 
Construction; AMEC Construction; Tully Construction; and Bovis Lend Lease). 
187 Concern about the potential long-term health effects of September 11th is widespread 
and has led to the creation of the World Trade Center Health Registry.  See World Trade 
Center Health Registry, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2006); see also Kirk Johnson, Inquiry Opens Into Effects of 9/11 Dust, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2003, at B1.  Any future negative health effects could give rise to lawsuits against 
the city or its contractors that would be covered by the captive fund. 
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from their involvement in clean-up after September 11,188 it frequently is cited as an 
alternative to the GCRA.189 
The fund was unprecedented190 and is imperfect.  A frequent complaint is that the 
pool is capped at $1 billion.191  Injuries continue to mount, and, in all likelihood, will 
continue to be discovered for years to come.192  The amount of litigation stemming from 
contractors’ Ground Zero work continues to grow.193  Thus, it is unclear whether $1 billion 
will be sufficient to cover all third-party liability claims.  The amount set aside for the fund, 
however, was arbitrary, and, should it prove insufficient, the government can increase its 
size. 
Any program modeled on the September 11th insurance fund should, to the extent 
possible, address the shortcomings with its establishment and administration.194  
Nonetheless, the fund is preferable to the GCRA because it recognizes, to a certain extent, 
government responsibility for certain third-party injuries incurred during post-disaster 
clean-up,195 extends liability protection to contractors assisting the government and ensures 
                     
188 See Hearing, supra note 72, at 51 (statement of Michel Feigin) (“But for the WTC 
Captive [fund] . . . expenses for lawyers and consultants would have exceeded any fees 
made in a matter of months. . . .  In short, absent the captive [fund], responding to a disaster 
when called would have . . . put us out of business.”). 
189 See, e.g., id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.)); id. at 69 (statement of 
Dr. Beverly Wright). 
190 See GAO, FEMA’S 9/11 ASSISTANCE, supra note 183, at 30. 
191 Hearing, supra note 72, at 49 (statement of Michael Feigin). 
192 See Devlin Barrett, Sept. 11-Related Cancers May Not Appear for Decades, Doctors 
Say, BIOTERRORISM WEEK, Sept. 27, 2004, at 11. 
193 See Hearing, supra note 72, at 85 (statement of Paul Becker, President). 
194 For example, the PREP Act, unlike the GCRA or the SAFETY Act, provides for the 
establishment of a fund to compensate individuals negligently injured by covered 
countermeasures.  See Pub. L. 109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2829 – 32 (2005) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e).  This use of a fund suggests that Congress looked for 
guidance on how to manage risk from other prior endeavors besides the SAFETY Act, 
perhaps to one of the victim compensation funds.  To date, however, Congress has 
appropriated no money for the fund, see id. § 257d-6e(a), leading some to question its 
effectiveness.  See Press Release, Sen. Edward Kennedy, Sen. Tom Harkin & Sen. 
Christopher Dodd, Kennedy, Harkin and Dodd Protest Frist Liability Giveaway (Dec. 21, 
2005), available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/~kennedy/statements/05/12/2005C22413.html 
(“Without a real compensation program, the liability protection in the defense bill provides 
a Christmas present to the drug industry and a bag of coal to everyday Americans.”).  
Nonetheless, in the PREP Act, Congress recognized the fundamental unfairness of denying 
injured individuals any compensation, while the GCRA contains no such 
acknowledgement. 
195 See generally SIERRA CLUB, supra note 150 (discussing the federal government’s 
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their survival,196 and protects individuals negligently harmed by those contractors. 
A different fund model can be found in the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
(VICP),197 created by Congress in 1988 to stabilize the supply of vaccines and establish a 
streamlined compensation process for vaccine-related injuries.198  Under the VICP, the 
government assumes liability for vaccine-related injuries and deaths through a no-fault 
alternative to the tort system.199   VICP compensation is paid out of the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Trust Fund, which is financed by a seventy-five cent tax on certain 
vaccines.200 
Congress intended the VICP to provide compensation “quickly, easily, and with 
certainty and generosity.”201  Like the September 11th fund, however, the VICP has not 
                                                       
failure to adequately warn, protect, account for, and treat individuals living and working in 
lower Manhattan after September 11). 
196 Michael Feigin of Bovis Lend Lease claimed that the “current World Trade Center 
related litigation demonstrates the need for additional clarity, not only to protect contractors 
from liability, but also to eliminate or discourage the costly and time consuming process of 
the litigation itself.”  Hearing, supra note 72, at 52 (statement of Michael Feigin).  Earlier, 
however, he had admitted that Bovis had received compensation for its work at Ground 
Zero and had fewer litigation expenses and potential liabilities due to the September 11th 
captive insurance program.  See id. at 31.  Thus, a program based on the September 11th 
fund would recognize and address the financial threats contractors face when they assist the 
government in disaster relief.   
197 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2000).  See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION 
PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2004), http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ fact_sheet.htm 
[hereinafter VICP FACT SHEET]. 
198 See VICP FACT SHEET, supra note 197; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-8, 
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY 
AND EASILY 4 - 5 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00008.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION].  Prior to the creation of the VICP, the 
threat of litigation faced by vaccine manufacturers resulted in serious vaccine shortages 
which, in turn, decreased the rate of child immunization.  See Compensating Vaccine 
Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 106 
(1999) (statement of Thomas E. Balbier, Jr., Director, National Vaccine Injury Program). 
199 The Secretary of Health and Human Services is the designated respondent in lawsuits 
filed under the VICP.  VICP FACT SHEET, supra note 197.  The vaccine manufacturer and 
administrator are not involved in the proceedings.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(3).  
200 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2000). The fund, however, is available 
to compensate for vaccine-related injuries that occurred both before and after its 
establishment.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i). 
201 H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986); see also GAO/HHES-00-8, supra note 198, at 
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pleased everyone.202  Any indemnification regime based on previously established funds 
should, of course, incorporate the lessons learned from its predecessors.  Although neither 
fund is perfect, both the September 11th captive insurance company and the VICP are more 
responsible and equitable approaches to the alleviation of crushing liabilities than the 
GCRA. 
V.  CONCLUSION: OF JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 
As the World Trade Center attacks and Hurricane Katrina violently demonstrated, 
the government heavily relies upon the private sector’s expertise, and its nearly limitless 
capacity, after national disasters to provide emergency services, restore order, and begin the 
reconstruction process.  Contractors -- drawn both by altruistic interests and profit motives -
- promptly answer the government’s call.  Experience suggests that, in their haste, neither 
the government nor its contractors obtain sufficient information to assess and avoid the 
risks associated with critical tasks, such as rescue operations and debris removal.  To the 
extent that haste breeds an absence of, or reduction in, caution, the potential for negligent 
injury increases. 
A legal regime in which injured parties alone bear the costs of contractor negligence 
is untenable. Accordingly, the government mandates, and reimburses the costs of, 
contractor insurance.  If, due to the immensity of destruction following a disaster or 
inadequate information in light of a crisis, the insurance industry fails to offer economically 
feasible protection to contractors, the government must fill the void.  The government -- 
armed with sovereign immunity and able to, on the one hand, widely disperse the burden to 
the taxpaying public and, on the other hand, incur and carry debt -- may choose to directly 
insure its contractors.  But in no event can the government’s recognition that it must 
provide meaningful protection for its contractors result in unmitigated risk to potential 
                                                       
5 (“VICP features designed to expedite the process include a relaxation of the rules of 
evidence, discovery, and other legal procedures that can prolong cases in the legal 
system.”). 
202 Concerns raised include the VICP’s processing time, the adversarial nature of the 
process, the imbalance between the resources available to the opposing parties, and the fund 
balance.  See Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on 
Government Reform, 106th Cong. 32 - 34 (1999) (statement of Linda Mulhauser, a 
petitioner of the VICP fund); id. at 58 - 59 (statement of Marcel Kinsbourne, pediatric 
neurologist); id. at 79 – 91 (statement of Clifford J. Shoemaker, Senior Partner, Shoemaker 
& Horn); GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 198, at 19 (“While VICP was 
expected to provide compensation for vaccine-related injuries quickly and easily, these 
expectations have often not been met.”); id. at 7 - 11, 16. 
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victims of contractor negligence.  Legislative solutions must consider the interests of the 
government, the contractors upon which the government depends, and the public.   
Governmental indemnification, on an ad hoc basis, has proven effective.  Similarly, where 
the insurance industry cannot provide a market solution, the government, in large part 
successfully, has experimented with captive funds or pools. 
In the end, any legislative solution should endeavor to achieve two potentially 
synergistic ends: deterring, to the optimal degree, contractors from causing harm and, when 
harm does result, compensating the victims.  Because the two ends are not entirely 
identical, balance is required.  Forcing contractors to internalize all of the costs of harm 
imposed upon victims -- particularly where there is a failure of the insurance market -– 
could result in excessively risk averse behavior.  Such behavior could impede and 
potentially frustrate recovery efforts or dramatically increase the government’s costs. 
Conversely, unnecessary or excessive protection might encourage irresponsible behavior or, 
at a minimum, discourage firms from undertaking a socially desirable level of care.  For 
example, creating a government-financed litigation fund without a cap may prove effective 
for compensating victims, but it would not serve to deter potential tortfeasors.  Conversely, 
such a cap likely would result in either victims or contractors bearing some portion of the 
cost of the harms caused. 
The sponsors of the Gulf Coast Recovery Act do not appear to have grappled with 
these thorny issues.  Rather, the GCRA smacks of opportunism, and accordingly, merits 
attention and scrutiny.  As a matter of law, it distorts the government contractor defense 
beyond recognition.  As a matter of policy, the breadth and scope of Hurricane Katrina’s 
devastation fail to justify capitulation to the unsubstantiated and oft-rebuffed contractor 
demands for insulation from liability.  No empirical case proves that the insurance market 
has failed or that broad insulation of disaster-area contractors is necessary.  Moreover, the 
GCRA would not encourage responsible contractor behavior; instead it creates a moral 
hazard, exposing potential victims to physical injury and financial ruin.  Any solution that 
potentially increases the risk of negligent injuries is fundamentally flawed.  It also violates 
basic principles of justice and fairness, particularly after the devastation already caused by 
Hurricane Katrina.  The Gulf Coast Recovery Act’s effort to capitalize upon national 
disasters is not only ill-conceived and inefficient, but harms the credibility of the federal 
government’s procurement process.  Congress should examine its own legislative repertoire 
more fully before going down this perilous path. 
